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Using publicly available data from three South African Development Finance Institutions 
(DFI’s), this study examines the risk appetite of Business Partners (BP), the National 
Empowerment Fund (NEF) and the Small Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA). This study 
analyses data between 2011 and 2015 to determine the DFI’s risk appetite and to identify key 
determinants of risk appetite with regard to funding SMEs, specifically startups.  The study’s 
findings reveal that South African DFI’s have a high to extremely high-risk appetite level and 
that state-owned DFI’s, NEF and SEFA have a higher risk appetite for funding SMEs 
specifically startup related loan products than private DFI BP. The study’s findings also  
illustrates that South African DFI’s risk appetites have a weaker negative relationship with 
shorter-term financial products than longer-term financial products indicating a higher risk 
appetite for funding shorter-term financial products. 
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1.1. Background of the study 
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) play a crucial role in the development of 
entrepreneurship in a manner that spurs growth and creates jobs. DFIs contribute to economic 
development through direct impact investing in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to 
stimulate economic activity and positively drive growth rates. SMEs, especially startup 
enterprises, are critical for ensuring economic expansion and accelerated stimulation of socio-
economic growth and development (Mass and Herrington, 2006) which is vital for sustained 
economic growth. 
DFIs are specialised development focused government or private controlled financial 
institutions that provide finance to enterprises in order to address market failure resulting 
from SMEs failure to secure finance from commercial financial institutions (Dalberg, 2010). 
This study analyses the Risk Appetite levels of three South African DFIs whose mandate is to 
provide higher risk funding for enterprise development and the funding of startup ventures. 
DFIs, as custodians of investments that are made into their development funds, operate within 
certain risk parameters which are developed and guided by their Board of Directors whose 
role it is to oversee their development mandate in order to achieve maximum returns while 
limiting levels of risk exposure. The parameters are articulated and conveyed within the 
funding institutions’ risk appetite framework, which details the total exposure that the 
financial institution is prepared to undertake on the basis of risk-return trade-offs for one or 
more desired and expected outcomes (RIMS, 2012). 
The Board of Directors, who are elected to guide the institution, are responsible for the 
development and implementation of their organisation's risk appetite framework. The “board 
determines the nature, and extent, of the significant risk the company is willing to embrace in 
the implementation of its strategy” (Financial Reporting Council, 2011: 3). 
The development of an effective and clearly understandable risk appetite model which 
embodies the naturally riskier nature of startup enterprise funding requirements is a challenge 
based on the fact that the primary risk of any SME is the lower probability of fund repayment 
(Dietsch and Petey, 2002). This implies that SMEs, especially startup enterprises, are more 
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likely to secure funding of a short-term nature as longer-term funding has a higher probability 
of default.  
DFI’s play an important role in ensuring that small enterprises have an alternative for finance 
which in term increases access to finance to the unfinanced market. The Small Enterprise 
assistance fund conducted a study in other developing nations wherein they found that 
investment in smaller enterprises is able to “generate positive financial returns” (SEAF, 
2004). Small enterprises provide jobs and thus assist in the elevation of poverty through 
employment creation. DFIs play a pivotal role in financing the unfinanced small enterprises 
thus improving access to finance and the provision of semi-skilled or unskilled labour 
through small enterprises (SEAF, 2004)  
Without sufficient funding for startup enterprises, South Africa will face challenges in 
sustaining and increasing its economic growth in relation to other developing economies. 
Developing economies have seen stronger growth rates than more advanced economies 
(Groepe, 2015) with Africa experiencing higher real GDP growth of 3.6% in 2015, against 
the global economies 3.1% and Europe’s 1.5% (AEO, 2016). With Africa being the second 
fastest growth economy in 2015, sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) experienced 
economic growth of 4.2% second to the East Africa growth rate of 6.3% (AEO, 2016). South 
Africa in contrast has experienced a low revised growth rate of 0.4% in 2016 with 2017 and 
2018 forecast to reach 1.2% and 1.6%, substantially lower than the rest of Africa (MPC, 
2016). 
Identifying the determinants of DFI risk appetite is instrumental in analysing DFI provision 
of SME finance. This research paper provides insight into how DFIs risk appetite influences 
the type of SME finance provided by DFIs and provision of startup funding.  
1.2. Statement of the problem 
DFIs are established to promote access to finance for enterprises and infrastructure projects 
which are unable to secure funding based on their risk profile. According to Massa in a book 
by Triki and Faye (2013), DFIs mandates are based on three principles (i) additionality, (ii) 
catalytic role, and (iii) sustainability focused on bridging investment gaps. With the existence 
of a number of DFIs in South Africa, it is interesting to note from both the 2015 and 2016 
Seed Academy Annual Startup Survey that financial support is still ranked number 1 by 
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entrepreneurs as the area with the greatest need.  The 2016 survey results reveal that 47% of 
respondents were unable to raise funds. The Seed Academy Survey highlights the fact that 
even though sufficient SME funding is available from DFIs, their risk appetite levels may not 
support the provision of startup finance.  Only 2% of the Seed Academy Survey respondents 
indicated that they received funding from DFI’s which is the same percentage for banks and 
therefore begs the question, are DFIs fulfilling their catalytic mandate principle? 
In order to fully maximise the potential of enterprise development and entrepreneurship, 
access to finance is a hurdle that needs to be overcome. DFIs’ risk appetite level indicates its 
willingness to provide SME finance. 
To determine the risk appetite levels of DFIs and how determinants identified from the study 
influence SME and startup funding using risk appetite as an indication; key research 
questions have been developed. Access to funding is still a challenge and thus a high risk 
appetite from the DFI’s may positively impact small enterprise development. The study 
attempts to obtain answers to the following questions: 
 Do privately-owned DFIs in South Africa have higher risk appetite levels than state-
owned DFIs?
 Do DFIs in South Africa have a higher risk appetite for startup related (short-term)
funding products than for other (long-term) products?
1.3. Research Objectives 
The objective of this study is to ascertain the risk appetite levels of three DFIs and how it 
influences DFIs’ preference with regard to the provision of SME and startup funding 
products.  
This paper will address the following objectives: 
 To determine if state-owned DFIs have a higher risk appetite than private DFIs.
 To determine if South African DFIs have a higher risk appetite for startup related
funding products relative to other products.
The underlying objective of this study is to ascertain if DFIs’ risk appetite levels are 
sufficient to enable the DFIs to play a catalytic role in SME and startup finance. 
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1.3.1. Hypotheses 
The hypotheses developed are based on the experiences of startup enterprises who believe the 
risk appetite levels of the DFIs negatively impact their ability to secure funding. Taking into 
consideration the responses from the seed academy survey of 2015 and 2016, this study aims 
to determine if the below hypothesis will provide results which will enable an appropriate 
interpretation. 
In order to address the research questions and attain the study objectives, the following 
hypotheses are tested: 
Hypothesis 1 
H0: South African State ̵Owned DFIs have a higher risk appetite than private DFIs. 
H1: South African State ̵Owned DFIs do not have a higher risk appetite 
Hypothesis 2 
H0: South African DFIs have a lower risk appetite for funding startup related funding 
products than other products. 
H1: South African DFIs have a higher risk appetite for funding startup related funding 
products. 
1.4. Justification and Significance of the study 
The International Organization for Standardization Guide 73 on risk management vocabulary 
(2009) defines risk appetite as the amount and type of risk an organisation is willing to pursue 
or retain. Risk appetite is developed by the board of directors of an organisation to indicate 
parameters and level of risk exposure the organisation is prepared to take. The risk appetite 
also indicates the potential acceptable loss and thus guides an organisation such as DFIs’ 
investment committee on how much risk will be acceptable. Economic development is a key 
mandate point for DFIs who provide high-risk funding facilities to SMEs. In order to be 
effective, DFIs need to have a high-risk appetite. With SMEs ranking financial support as the 
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number 1 need in both the 2015 and 2016 Seed Academy Annual Startup Survey, a high-risk 
appetite from DFIs is critical to impacting this need. 
This study shall contribute to the body of knowledge through determining the Risk Appetite 
levels of South African DFIs and how the risk appetite levels affect the provision of certain 
enterprise funding products. By identifying and analysing the determinants of DFIs risk 
appetite, this study will provide insight into how risk appetite levels affect the funding of 
SMEs and startups. In addition, this study will aid DFIs in developing Risk Appetite 
strategies which enable the effective and efficient implementation of their development 
mandate. The core indicators determined will provide policy and decision makers with 
crucial information regarding the effectiveness of DFIs in improving access to finance for 
SMEs and startups. 
1.5. Organisation of the study 
The research paper will be organised as follows: Chapter One introduces the reader to the 
background information of the study followed by the problem statement relating to the need 
for the study to be conducted. The problem statement is then followed by the objectives of 
the study and the hypothesis of the study. Chapter Two identifies and reviews relevant 
academic literature covering risk appetite, DFIs and the funding of startups. The literature 
review synthesises academic research relating to the potential impact of risk appetite and how 
DFIs’ risk appetite can affect their funding of startups. 
Chapter Three identifies and reviews relevant South Africa literature covering risk appetite, 
DFIs and the funding of startups in South Africa. The literature review synthesises local 
literature relating to the potential impact of risk appetite and how DFIs risk appetite can 
affect their funding of startups in South Africa. Chapter Four focuses on the research 
methodology used in the research study. This methodology includes the research design 
selected for the study, the study area, sampling procedures, sources of data, data collection 
instruments and methodology. Chapter Five outlines the data analysis process based on the 
data collected. The data collected is analysed in order to test the hypotheses developed and to 
provide answers to the research questions outlined in the research paper. Chapter Six draws 
conclusions from the data analysis and provides interpretation of the results. The findings of 
the research are discussed and interpreted in terms of the hypotheses and research questions. 
Recommendations take into consideration the constraints and limitations of the study and 





Development finance refers to the pool of resources available for financing development in 
developing countries (Ocran, 2012). This pool of resources is facilitated by DFIs mandated to 
address market failures through investing in the private sector to impact development and the 
mobilisation of private sector capital (te Velde, 2011).  Development finance is underpinned 
by the higher levels of risk that DFIs are able to tolerate. The international development 
finance system can be broken down into six main groups: Bilateral Donors; Private 
Commercial Sector; Multilateral Donors; Global Funds; NGO’s and Private Philanthropy 
(Ocran, 2012). This study focuses on DFIs that fall within the Bilateral Donor, Private 
Commercial and Multilateral Donors sectors. 
In this chapter, the literature concerning the role of DFIs in improving access to finance for 
SMEs and  startups will be reviewed.  The type of funding products provided by DFIs will be 
outlined and literature about the challenges and risks of access to finance will be reviewed. 
The concept of risk appetite will be explored and the determinants of risk appetite will be 
examined. Finally, the economic impact of startups will be discussed. 
2.2 Role of DFIs in improving access to finance for SMEs 
The role of DFIs is underpinned by their mandate to foster and develop sustainable economic 
growth through the projects and enterprises they invest in. DFIs have the capacity to provide 
a range of financial services aimed at addressing high-risk enterprise requirements with 
instruments such as loans and guarantees to investors and entrepreneurs. The development 
nature of DFIs enables investment and financial services to be provided to applicants who 
would not qualify for such services from the commercial banking sector due to their lack of 
collateral or security which give them a higher risk profile.  
DFIs main role is the addressing of market failures through the provision of financial 
products which maximise the development impact in their strategic area. DFIs are regarded as 
“catalysts for accelerated industrialisation, economic growth and human resource 
development” (Gumede et al., 2011:1). In established and developing nations, DFIs have 
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shown the critical role that they can play in terms of transforming entire economies and 
providing game-changing industrial and economic intervention which results in dramatically 
scaled economic growth paths for impacted economies (Gumede et al., 2011). DFIs’ role 
focuses on one or many of the following objectives: investment in a sustainable private 
sector; maximising development impact while ensuring long-term institutional financial 
stability and the mobilisation of private sector capital through financial intermediation (te 
Velde, 2011). 
DFIs should inherently have a higher risk appetite in terms of provision of loans when 
compared to commercial private financial institutions as a result of their development 
mandate and higher tolerance levels. It is the objective of this research paper to determine if 
this is the case with regards to South African DFIs as a major challenge for DFIs is to refrain 
from crowding out private investments in lower risk projects but rather maintain focus on 
actively expanding access to finance to under-developed, under-invested high-risk enterprises 
and sectors which may have a large development impact on the economy. The success of 
DFIs with regards to impacting economic growth is affected by their approach to certain 
financial concepts of: Transaction costs; Economics of contracts; The principal-agent 
problem; Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard. 
2.2.1 Transaction costs 
Transaction costs encompass the costs incurred by financial institutions when engaging and 
undertaking transactions. DFIs which are financial intermediaries have four critical roles to 
play with regards to transaction costs: 1) provision of adequate liquidity risk sharing; 2) 
reduction of inefficiencies arising from asymmetric information; 3) ensuring the incentives 
are well aligned, to pre-empt the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection; 4) 
facilitation of scale economies in the conduct of transaction and the provision of logistics 
(Hasman, Samartin and van Bommel, 2010). This, in essence, implies that effective DFIs 
should contribute immensely to the reduction of transaction costs (Ocran, 2010) which is 
critical for developing economies. Transaction costs are reduced by DFIs through reduced 
transaction processing costs and the provision of certain risk-reducing financial products thus 
enabling higher risk enterprises to benefit from their financial products. 
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2.2.2 Economics of contracts 
Economic contracts impact the manner in which DFIs can reduce transaction costs. Contracts 
are predominately not complete as they can never unambiguously measure and address every 
foreseeable contingency or situation that may arise which is what defines a complete contract. 
In the economy, a legally incomplete contract is where parties to the contract accept the terms 
of the agreement which are subject to available information (Rao, 2003). The contracts have a 
negative impact on transaction costs which are the basis for the determination of principal 
and interest payments, repayment periods, collateral arrangements and other terms and 
conditions pursuant to the contract and thus DFIs objective is to limit these costs and their 
possible negative cost implications (Ocran, 2012).  
2.2.3 The Principal-Agent Problem 
Financial intermediation and the provision of financial services is a challenge which is 
hampered by the Principal-Agent problem, also referred to as the agency dilemma, which is 
based on the seminal work of Ross (1973) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). The Principal-
Agent problem occurs as a result of asymmetric information where the principal and agent 
enter into a contract to perform which results in a delegation of certain authority to make 
decisions by the principal to the agent. With both parties to the contract being utility 
maximizers, there exists the potential that both parties do not share the same motivations for 
entering into a specific contract. This difference in motivation can result in a divergent view 
of performance in line with the terms of the contract entered into by the two parties. The 
principals’ interest is in ensuring effective and efficient use of the funds provided to the 
agent. 
DFIs experience the principal-agency problem in two scenarios: (1) as the agent with the 
donor or taxpayer as the principal; and (2) as the principal with the borrowing SME as the 
agent. The principal-agent problem is addressed by the principal through the introduction of 
various mechanisms and or instruments into a transaction and the contract in order to align 
the motivations and performance requirements of the principal and the agent. The principal-
Agent problem results in agency costs which are directly dependent on the degree of 
information asymmetry and the cost implications of monitoring and accessing such relevant 
information (Ocran, 2010).  
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These agency costs can be high for the principal donor, taxpayer or DFI who provide the 
funds to the agent DFI or SME due to the need to ensure funds disbursed are used according 
to the agreed contracts. In high risk transactions such as startup funding where there is limited 
or no information on enterprise history, high agency costs can have a negative impact on the 
level of financial services provided by the DFIs to certain applicants or even resulting in the 
crowding out of more higher risk transactions due to the associated higher agency costs 
(Ocran, 2012).  
2.2.4 Asymmetric Information 
Asymmetric Information is the lack of equal available information between two parties who 
are engaged in a transaction (Rao. 2003). Banks or financial institutions that are focused on 
providing loans are concerned about the return and the repayment of a loan application which 
affects the risk profile of the loan application (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The existence of 
asymmetric information results in adverse selection, creating a market for lemons (Akerlof, 
1970) where applicants who are willing to pay high interest rates are on average higher risk 
applicants (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  
Transaction costs are negatively impacted by the level of asymmetric information where 
increasing search costs and monitoring costs negatively impact the loan applications risk 
profile (Huang et al., 2014). Due to credit rationing, asymmetric information is a concern as it 
crowds out SMEs with potential for growth and as a result limits the impact of increased 
SME activity in the economy (Huang et al., 2014). Financial institutions in developing 
economies have challenges identifying creditworthy applicants and this is largely due to 
asymmetric information challenges (Ocran, 2012). 
2.2.5 Moral Hazard 
Moral Hazard occurs when “a party which is responsible for the interest of the other party has 
incentive to put her own interest ahead of the other party” (Ocran, 2012: 18). This challenge 
occurs in financial institutions where a banker takes risks beyond certain levels knowingly 
because the banker can transfer those risks to another party. Moral hazard stems from 
asymmetric information, where approved loan applicants engage in opportunistic behaviour 
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resulting in a higher risk of default (Huang et al., 2014). Moral hazard exists in environments 
where accountability is a challenge. The existence of adverse selection and moral hazard 
results in credit rationing which negatively impacts any gains achieved in improving access 
to finance (Huang et al., 2014). Moral Hazard is inherent in development finance and thus the 
structure and the approval mechanisms to ensure achievement of development objectives are 
vital.  
2.3 Types of funding products provided by DFIs 
Unique characteristics of DFIs as compared to conventional financial institutions are based 
on an outlined provided by te Velde in 2011 where: DFI’s focus on investing in sustainable 
private sector projects while  ensuring a positive impact on development not withstanding 
being viable over a long term period and mobilising private sector capital (te Velde, 2011). 
The DFI’s ability to successfully achieve its goals is through its products which are 
influenced by the entities risk appetite. 
DFIs have a myriad of financial and non-financial products designed and provided to SMEs. 
This study will focus on various types of funding products available to SMEs and startups 
from DFIs. The first type of funding product is a business term loan. This is offered by DFIs 
based on the following basic elements: Credit is extended to a business concern; a direct 
relationship between borrower and lender exists and the principal payment is repayable over 
a period longer than one year (Jacoby and Saulnier, 1942). 
A term loan is a form of credit extended to a business enterprise by a DFI based on the 
business’ ability to make repayments on the loan and profitability rather than based on 
security or collateral provided (Jacoby and Saulnier, 1942). The most important characteristic 
of a term loan is that it has a repayment period longer than 12 months thus categorising term 
loans under long-term funding. This type of funding is the most challenging for startup 
enterprises to secure. 
The second product is an instalment sale agreement which is similar to term loans but has 
specific characteristics which separate it from term loans and these are as follows: most 
agreements are secured by income generating assets, buyers profile and sellers’ profile; 
financing income generating assets/equipment can be based on a structured bulk transaction 
between buyer and single seller based on identical terms not based on borrowers’ risk profile; 
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it relates specifically to commercial and industrial equipment and excludes working capital or 
financing of consumer goods and the relationship between lender and borrower is established 
through the seller intermediary (Jacoby and Saulnier, 1942). This type of funding has a 
repayment period that typically ranges from 24 months and beyond categorising this funding 
under long-term funding. 
The third type of a product is bridging finance, which is categorised as a short-term loan, a 
type of loan provided to enterprises over a period of less than 12 months. Short term loans are 
provided to enterprises with the intention to meet, replace or complement existing financing 
already secured by the enterprises. Short term loans are utilised by businesses to finance short 
term or temporary cash flow and or working capital requirements of the enterprise (Isaacs, 
2014). 
Short term loans or bridging loans are used by companies that are experiencing rapid growth 
and thus require the financing to facilitate the fulfilment of sales orders alternatively. They 
are also used by enterprises in financial distress in order to meet their short-term financial 
obligations. Startup enterprises funding requirements fall predominantly in this category. 
Short term loans unlike term loans often require significantly less requirements and thus are 
more accessible to higher risk profile enterprises such as startups and depending on the 
reason the funding is required for, these loans can be secured against enterprise assets or can 
be offered on an unsecured basis (Isaacs, 2014). 
Another type of product is structured finance which is “techniques employed whenever the 
requirements of the originator or owner of an asset, be they concerned with funding, liquidity, 
risk transfer, or other need, cannot be met by an existing, off-the-shelf product or instrument. 
Hence, to meet this need, existing products and techniques must be engineered into a tailor-
made product or process. Thus, structured finance is a flexible financial engineering tool” 
(Fabozzi et al., 2006). This type of finance is applicable for loans that are approved for 
enterprises which do not fall within the standard term, instalment or short term loan product 
structure. This type of finance also applies to project, contract and order finance loans 
provided to enterprises. Structured finance refers to a “variety of debt and related securities 
whose promise to repay investors is backed by (1) the value of some form of financial asset 
or (2) the credit support from a third party to the transaction” (Fabozzi et al., 2006) such as an 
off-take agreement underpinned by the creditworthiness of the buyer.  
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The International Project Finance Association (IPFA) defines project financing as the 
financing of long-term infrastructure or industrial projects and public services based on a 
non-recourse or limited recourse financial structure, where debt and equity are used to fund 
the project and is paid back from the cash flows generated by the project. Project Finance 
also known as contract or order finance in terms of startups can be used to fund short-term 
projects and is not entirely limited to infrastructure or industrial projects. The most important 
aspect of this type of funding is the limited or non-recourse aspect where debt secured for the 
project/contract or order is repaid using the cash flows generated from the project/contract or 
order.  
Key advantages of Structured Finance are: limited or non-recourse type of finance; collateral 
is secured using the projects or contracts assets or off-take agreement; first priority is given to 
the project financier in terms of repayments; can be off-balance sheet finance and the 
financing period is structured according to the duration of contract/order. 
Key disadvantages of Structured Finance include the fact that it can take longer to structure 
and execute especially for larger projects; it can have higher transaction costs; it can be 
restrictive in terms of managerial decision making and requires disclosure of stakeholder 
strategy & intellectual property. These disadvantages make it a less attractive funding option 
for start-up enterprises. 
2.4 Challenges and Risks of Access to Finance 
Startup enterprises experience and face numerous challenges when attempting to secure 
funding. In South Africa, SME lending has been viewed as a significant problem by SMEs 
including startup enterprises (NCR, 2011). South Africa is seen to have a well-developed and 
highly concentrated financial sector dominated by banks (NCR, 2011). The availability of 
capital for startups and SMEs is impacted by borrower and lender factors such as interest 
rates charged; agency problems; asymmetric information; adverse selection and monitoring 
challenges (NCR, 2011). 
These challenges affect SMEs alike with startups being more negatively impacted by the 
challenges when trying to secure finance (NCR, 2011). Enterprise specific factors which 
influence access to finance include managerial competencies; quality of business information; 
availability of collateral and networking; fluctuation of earnings; low survival rate of SMEs; 
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lack of accurate records and management of finances; size of enterprise; ownership structure 
and legal structure of enterprise (NCR, 2011) and the type and period of loans required by the 
enterprise. 
The factors above contribute immensely to the success of startups and SMEs in terms of 
accessing finance. With South Africa’s current low levels of entrepreneurial activity when 
compared to other countries, it becomes prudent to ascertain if enough support especially in 
terms of provision of funding, is provided to startup enterprises which have been shown to 
have the ability to positively impact job creation, economic growth and income distribution 
(Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2016). 
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2015/2016) reported that the weakest area of South 
Africa’s entrepreneurship ecosystem is around: “government programmes and policies, 
school-level entrepreneurship education and training, research and development transfer, and 
cultural and social norms” (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2016:6).  
Key challenges highlighted in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2015/2016) report 
relating to  startup funding and funding initiatives include the lack of well administered 
funding programmes; investors and funders in South Africa are seen as too risk-averse; lack 
of field experience from those responsible for assessing funding applications; risk-averse 
banking sector which often doesn’t lend to startups or SMEs; pressure of government funding 
programmes to be sustainable and profitable making them more risk-averse; public funding 
institutions tend to use same risk matrix as banks resulting in similar resistance to startups as 
banks;  large banks are security-based lenders which make it more attractive to seek formal 
sector employment if one wants to access finance for assets or consumption; lack of security 
from entrepreneurs to enable them to access finance and lack of track record results in 
startups and SMEs being categorised as high risk and thus leading to lenders requiring high 
collateral. 
With all of these funding concerns, challenges and risks faced by startups, researching their 
impact on South Africa’s economic growth and unemployment is instrumental in enabling 
economic development. Startups and SMEs contribute tremendously to job creation and 
economic growth. The question is, do startups have sufficient funding support or is the South 
African funding environment which actively promotes entrepreneurship, in reality more risk 
averse towards startup related funding. It should be noted that the funding of startup 
enterprises is highly risky due to low survival rates of startups within the first five years of 
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operations, but this does not negate their positive impact. In order for startups and SMEs to 
have the desired employment and economic impact, the culture of conservatism and risk-
averseness need to be addressed (GEM, 2016).  
2.5 Risk Appetite 
Risk Appetite is an integral guidance, evaluation and monitoring tool used by various 
financial organisations to provide, organisation-wide, the risk parameters for the fulfilment of 
the organisation's mandate. “Risk appetite is defined as the level of risk a bank is ready to 
accept (assuming the risk is measurable) to generate a particular rate of return” (Hassani, 
2014: 2). A well-defined and articulated risk appetite framework is the cornerstone of 
effective Enterprise Risk Management. A well-defined risk appetite ensures internal 
consistency with regards to how decision makers in an organisation and employees pursue an 
organisation’s objectives and strategy. Risk Appetite is an effective risk analysis tool which 
enables an organisation's key staff to distinguish between acceptable and undesirable risk 
when making project decisions (Burke et al., 2011).  
The role of an organisations risk appetite can be broken down into four main roles: (i) 
Support strategy setting; (ii) Support risk management; (iii) Set boundaries for risk taking and 
(iv) Support stakeholder value optimisation (Burke et al., 2011). An organisations risk
appetite is developed at the board of directors’ level based on the risk environment faced by 
the organisation during that period. These environmental risks are then identified and 
articulated in relation to three areas including acceptable risks, considerable risks based on 
certain conditions and unacceptable risks. 
Table 1: Components of Risk Appetite Concept 
Risk Appetite The Level of risk an organisation is willing to take 
Risk Tolerance Encompasses acceptable risk but also includes risk, even though 
undesirable, would be considered depending on certain 
conditions and scenarios  
Risk Bearing Capacity The maximum level of downside risk that a firm can accept 
Risk Profile Overall risk profile of enterprise 
Source: (Burke et al., 2011) 
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The concepts above form part of the Risk Appetite Framework which articulates the 
organisation's risk strategy and risk limits to enable seamless operational performance. 
According to Green Climate Fund (2015), the development and establishment process of an 
organisation’s risk appetite is based on the following core steps which are used as guidelines. 
Step 1: defining the various organisational risk types. Step 2: Defining the core risk centre’s 
in an organisation and attributing risk appetite to them. Step 3: Ascertaining methodology to 
measure identified risk in terms of potential losses and gains. Step 4: Final development of a 
Risk Appetite statement at board level. 
Knowledge of the steps above is integral to being able to determine and analyse an 
organisation’s risk appetite statement as it masks the in-depth level of detail synthesised into 
a Risk Appetite Framework which underpins the Risk Appetite Statement. Risk Appetite, 
which should be seen as an indication of the amount of risk an organisation is prepared to 
accept is interpreted based on a scale defining levels of risk ranging from acceptable (low 
risk) to non-acceptable (high risk), described using quantitative and qualitative information 
sourced from the organisation. While very effective in guiding organisations in terms of risks 
when fulfilling organisational objectives and strategy, there are existing challenges and flaws 
which limit the efficiency and effectiveness of the Risk Appetite Statement and various risk 
models.  
Challenges such as the emphasis placed on historical information as a basis for forecasting 
risk parameters fails to identify and provide sufficient weight to recent changes and new 
trends which could impact the organisation's ability to adhere to its risk appetite statement 
(McKinsey, 2011).  
Another challenge experienced by organisations is the over-reliance on risk models to 
determine risk levels thus indirectly limiting their effectiveness as a result of the exclusion of 
key staff expertise and knowledge in identifying and interpreting risk levels (McKinsey, 
2011). This challenge leads to managerial and key staff complacency resulting in a gradual 
deviation from the organisation's mandate and objectives. Risk models, such as Risk Appetite 
are exploratory decision-making tools which are developed to guide and support decisions 
made by key organisations staff based on the limited information provided (Pregler and 
Freeman, 2008). These models are based on various approaches with the probabilistic 
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modeling approach being the dominant approach based on input assumptions collated from 
the organisation's data, mandate and objectives. 
2.6 Determinants of Risk Appetite Levels 
Risk appetite is the level of risk an institution is prepared to accept in the course of achieving 
its organisational objectives. Institutions with higher risk appetite accept higher volatility in 
returns with focus being on value creation and then returns whereas institutions with a lower 
risk appetite that are considered to be more risk averse focus more on steady lower risk 
pursuits (Rims, 2012).  
Risk appetite is determined by a number of factors in an organisation including existing risk 
profile; risk capacity; risk tolerance and attitudes towards risk (Rittenberg and Martens, 
2012). The current risk profile of an organisation is based on the set of risks the organisation 
has defined as part of its strategy and risk management (ISO 73, 2009). The risk capacity of 
an organisation is the level of risk the organisation is able to sustain in the pursuit of its 
strategic plan (Rittenberg and Martens, 2012). In terms of funding institutions, the 
institution's loan book can represent the capacity to provide loans. The risk tolerance of an 
organisation is tactical and operational, based on the level of acceptable risk volatility the 
organisation is willing to accept with regards to pursuing its strategic objectives (Rittenberg 
and Martens, 2012). The risk tolerance is measured using the organisation's performance 
metrics, setting the boundaries of performance volatility. The organisation’s attitude towards 
risk is the fourth critical determinant which relates to the organisation's approach towards 
achieving its growth, risk and investment return objectives (Rittenberg and Martens, 2012). 
In order for an organisation’s risk appetite to be effective, the organisation needs to adopt the 
risk appetite at the board level; translate and communicate the adopted risk appetite 
throughout the organisation and monitor the risk appetite on an ongoing basis (Rittenberg and 
Martens, 2012). Risk appetite forms the basis of the risk appetite framework which is a tool 
designed to assist executive management in aligning the organisation’s willingness to take 
risks with the organisation’s ability to take those risks (Wyman, 2012). Risk appetite must be 
measurable and is determined quantitatively and qualitatively through the use of key risk 
indicators.  
The risk appetite of an organisation is determined based on three organisational levels 
comprising of a strategic level; a tactical level or an operational level (Gorzen-Mikta and 
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Wieczorek-Kosmala, 2013).  At strategic level, risk appetite determines the organisation's 
strategic approach towards risk. At a tactical level, the risk appetite of an organisation 
dictates the implementation of the strategic level risk appetite and at the operational level the 
risk appetite informs how daily operational risks are to be addressed (Gorzen-Mikta and 
Wieczorek-Kosmala, 2013). At the strategic level, value creation is the key determinant. Key 
Risk Indicators (KCI) are tactical level determinants and Key Control Indicators (KCI) at the 
operational level are used to measure risk appetite (Gorzen-Mikta and Wieczorek-Kosmala, 
2013).  
Different organisations articulate their risk appetite differently ranging from a basic statement 
focusing on “low”, “medium” or “high” risk appetite levels to detailed statements precisely 
indicating percentage probability or growth level targets in line with the strategic objectives 
(Rittenberg and Martens, 2012). When determining risk appetite of financial services 
organisations such as DFIs, quantitative risk indicators and performance metrics form an 
integrate part of the organisation's risk appetite (Rittenberg and Martens, 2012). Financial 
institutions determine their risk appetite using performance modeling which may include 
metrics as maximum levels of loan impairments and specific portfolio allocation targets 
(Rittenberg and Martens, 2012). 
The risk appetite framework outlines the key risks to articulating risk appetite which form the 
basis of the risk appetite statement as outlined below. Key risk indicators are developed based 
on the risk targets, risk tolerances and risk limits guiding the risk appetite of the organisation. 
The organisation’s risk appetite can also be measured based on organisational strategy, 
preference, attractiveness, tolerances and limits which can be determined qualitatively or 
quantitatively from the organisations. These determinants combine to form the risk appetite 
framework which guides the enterprise risk management process and the development of the 
organisation's risk appetite. Table 2 below outlines the main components to developing an 
organisation's risk appetite using a RAF. 
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Table 2: Risk Appetite Framework (RAF) 
Risk Appetite 
Risk Strategy 
Strategic expression of an overall philosophy towards risk trading is necessary to achieve the 
mission, so that from the board on down there is alignment 
What risks to take How much risk to take 
Risk preferences 
Articulating risk as opportunity, identifying 
risks that need to be taken deliberately in the 
expectation of creating the value needed to 
achieve the mission 
Risk tolerances 
Quantitative expression of the amount of 
aggregate risk the organisation will tolerate 
over varying time horizons as a means to 
achieve its mission 
Risk attractiveness 
Tactical assessment of the risks within the 
preference set, reflecting current 
circumstances 
Risk limits 
Granular operational controls on specific 
risks, expressed in metrics that are locally 
relevant and practical to monitor 
Source: Towers Watson, 2013 
DFIs’ risk appetite statement or framework influences the institutions’ approach to the 
provision of services. This research paper aims to determine the DFIs’ risk appetite levels 
based on historical data analysis, categorising the risk appetite is either high or low and how 
the funding of existing and startup SMEs are affected by the risk appetite (RA). These levels 
(portfolio percentage exposure) can be categorised in a number of ways namely: Extremely 
high (RA) = 1.00+ (100% +); High (RA) = 0.5 – 1 (50% - 100%); medium (RA) = 0.25 – 0.5 
(25% - 50%) or Low (RA) = 0 - .25 (0 – 25%) risk appetite but crucially, the risk appetite 
levels have to be interpreted in the context of the DFIs’ past performance, mandate and 
existing risk tolerance parameters. 
Four key drivers impact how DFIs’ risk appetite or risk aversion influences their approach to 
investments: capital, earning, market size and risk confidence (Burke et al., 2011). Capital of 
a DFI in terms of the size of fund available for investments will impact the level of risk the 
DFIs board of directors is prepared to take. The market size in terms of the DFI’s operations 
will influence its risk appetite as an increase/decrease in the market will have a certain upside 
or downside risk. The earnings of the DFI will impact how the DFI’s board of directors 
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increase or decrease their future risk appetite as their fiduciary duty is the financial 
sustainability of the DFI. The final major driver is risk confidence in the context of past 
performance and portfolio success or loss. This driver is based on the confidence the DFI has 
in the type of investment decision it has to make (Burke et al., 2011). What this implies is 
that past performance of the market and the DFI’s investments will impact the risk appetite 
level the DFI has for certain investments such as startup funding or various sector 
investments. 
The challenge of access to finance is fuelled by the types of funding products available to 
SMEs and specifically startup organisations. DFIs provide different financial products to high 
risk underserviced economic sectors in order to improve the provision of financial services. 
Private financial markets located in emerging and developing economies tend to fail in the 
provision of sufficient long-term finance which is critical to economic investments and social 
development (WESS, 2005). The challenge in providing long-term financing is based on 
three reasons, imperfect market or existence of asymmetric information; borrower character 
and long-term macroeconomic factors resulting in lenders preferring a higher short-term 
concentration in their lending portfolio (WESS, 2005).  
The existence of asymmetric information in the SME and startup sector, firm size and lack of 
collateral result in financial institutions preferring to provide short-term funding over long 
term funding (WESS, 2005). The under provision of long-term finance from the private 
sector is a market failure DFIs are tasked to address through increasing the provision of 
longer term finance products (WESS, 2005). UNESCAP (2015) indicates six categories of 
SME finance instruments: informal, internal, debt-based products and services, equity-based 
funding avenues, non-collateralised debt products and government grants or subsidies. Risk 
appetite in the context of this study is restricted to the direct lending portfolios of the DFIs 
combining collateralised and non-collateralised debt products.  
2.7 Economic impact of Startups 
Since the financial crisis of 2007-2008, a large number of central banks have loosened their 
monetary policies in order to bring down interest rates for all firms in order to stimulate 
economic demand (OECD, 2016). This resulted in lower interest rates which were 
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unfortunately only received by larger enterprises with SMEs and startups receiving relatively 
higher interest rates (OECD, 2016).  
Startups and the impact they have on job creation and economic development can be 
“expressed as a combination of four different elements: the start-up rate; the average size of 
firms at entry; the survival rate; and the average growth rate of survivors” (Calvino et al., 
2015).  The four elements, even though not strongly positively correlated, contribute to the 
extent to which startups impact job creation (Calvino et al., 2015). A large percentage of 
startups do not have a high survival rate with a majority of startups falling under the 
subsistence entrepreneurs’ category. On average only 3% - 8% of startups create a 
disproportionate number of jobs ranging from 21% to as high as 52% in certain countries 
(Calvino et al., 2015). 
It becomes very important when relating to policy matters, that policy is set taking into 
consideration that regardless of the low survival and growth rates, startup enterprises play a 
vital role as catalysts for economic growth and are drivers of job creation (Calvino et al., 
2015). It is this very point that relates the need for this research paper to analyse the risk 
appetite of South African DFIs and their funding of startups to determine if these DFIs 
approach and funding allocation to startups is not negatively impacted by the high-risk nature 
of funding startups and their low survival rate. Allocative efficiency with regards to funding 
enterprises is key and thus this research paper focuses on an important factor of determining 
if these DFIs have embraced the risky nature of their funding space or are more likely to fund 
established less riskier enterprises which are less likely to experience higher percentage 
growth in terms of job creation. 
Startup enterprises contribute to job creation or destructions through three main avenues: 
creation of jobs through enterprise establishment creating a positive employment effect in the 
economy; destruction of jobs in the event of the  startup enterprise failing and thus having a 
negative employment effect on the economy and finally through the creation and destruction 
of jobs during the course of normal business operations such as the average operational 
enterprise in the economy (Calvino et al., 2015). It has been shown that these three avenues 
produce a positive net sum implying that startups and young enterprises should be regarded 
as net job creators (Calvino et al., 2015). This has also been confirmed by the intensive 
margin, which is the net job creation or destruction resulting from normal business 
operations, where startups are also regarded as net job creators. The study by OECD goes 
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further to note that taking into account all startups successful and failures over a five year 
period post entry, the surviving startups’ net job creation is sufficiently large enough to 
compensate for all jobs destructed by the startups that failed over the same period (Calvino et 
al., 2015). 
Non-performing loans have a large impact on the potential for lending to startups as it 
directly impacts the DFIs’ balance sheet which translates to a possible reduction in available 
credit, higher interest rates and more stringent conditions (OECD, 2015).  Startups are 




THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SELECTED DFIs IN IMPROVING ACCESS TO 
FINANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
In South Africa, DFIs are regarded as the potential solution to economic growth stagnation 
and industrial development limitations. This solution is only possible if these institutions are 
able to realise their full development potential which is focused on improving access to 
finance through providing financial services to the underserviced higher risk market. 
Development Finance is regarded as the provision of finance to under-serviced projects and 
economic development transactions. The United Nation sees DFIs as addressing five critical 
areas in terms of addressing market failures (Gumede et al., 2011): investing in development 
focused projects, long-term financial intermediation, providing technical support, capital 
raising and managing market failures. 
With DFIs’ role having developed and changed over the past couple of decades, DFIs are 
now expected to address broader development failures such as institutional failures which 
result from organisations failure to provide services of which they are mandated to, capacity 
failures resulting from insufficient skill base in the institution’s management, origination 
failures arising from the lack of or inability to source or secure projects in line with the 
institution's mandate and informational failures which tend to be rooted in information 
asymmetry problems (Gumede et al., 2011). 
Figure 1: Development Finance Institutions niche 
Source: An adaptation from Scott, 2008 by Gumede et al., 2011 
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Successful DFIs provide their services in a very risky environment and thus their risk appetite 
level and framework is critical in ensuring sustainable developmental success. The ability for 
DFIs to focus and fund this niche is of the utmost concern as in the past and may still be in 
the present. DFIs have adopted orthodox banking logic and designed risk management 
strategies which effectively rule our servicing the poor (Murray, A.1999). The importance for 
DFIs to focus on this niche is imperative. Access to finance and underdevelopment 
challenges are compounded by systemic African challenges as highlighted by Aziakpono 
(2011:2), “Firstly, there is a lack of collateral due to poorly defined property 
rights…Therefore, a very small percentage of people have the ability to offer their property 
as collateral for a loan”. 
The motivation for the study’s choice of DFIs specifically Business Partners (BP), the 
National Empowerment Fund (NEF) and the Small Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA) is 
based on the development mandates adopted by each of the three DFIs. The three DFIs were 
selected based on the following parameters: the DFI must be located in South Africa, the DFI 
must provide direct lending products to the SME and startup market, the DFIs must have a 
national footprint and the DFI should be in existence for at least three years between the 
period 2011 to 2015. Additional criteria used to select the DFIs were based on their intention 
to improve access to enterprise finance, their ability to provide innovative financial products 
and having an objective to develop the South African economy. 
3.2 Access to finance Financial Indicators 
Improving financial access is the cornerstone of the services and products provided by DFIs. 
Financial access is a critical challenge experienced by startups and existing SMEs thus 
making is vital to analyse the past performance of the three DFIs selected in this study in 
order to determine if past portfolio performance is reflective of improved financial access and 
more importantly, whether their risk appetite is supportive of improving financial access. 
Improvements in financial access and the impact thereof is determined by using key indicator 
variables which are called core financial impact indicators in this study. The key indicators 
are used by policy makers and key stakeholders to develop new policies and monitor whether 
SME finance challenges are being addressed. The key indicators provide information relating 
to key aspects in terms of SME access to information such as allocation of credit, structure of 
debt, demand for credit, SME and startup financing conditions, global, regional and local DFI 
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loan performance and SME and startup loan performance. These indicators are an amended 
version of the OECD core indicators in financing SMEs and entrepreneurs and have been 
developed as an enterprise risk management tool. In Table 3 indicators below, provide DFI 
specific information related to SME and startup loans. In Table 4 below, indicators show 
local, regional and global DFI loan performance comparison. Table 5 below, provides startup 
funding related information. Information gathered from these indicators provides 
policymakers and stakeholders a snap assessment of the SME and startup financing sectors in 
terms of DFI performance enabling a more targeted approach to SME and startup finance 
market failure. 
Table 3: Core Financial Impact Indicators per DFI 
Core Indicators What they Show Short name 
1.  Share of SME short-
term loans in total SME
loans
Debt structure of SMEs  ̶  % used for operations and 
working capital 
SMEST 
2.  Share of SME Long-
term loans in total SME
loans
Debt structure of SMEs  ̶  % used for investments and 
% used for expansion 
SMELT 
3.  Share of SME short-
term loans/Long-term
loans
Preference of DFI in terms of risk funding. The 
higher the %, the higher the risk appetite. 
SMESL 
4.  SME loans
disbursed/SME loans
approved
Used in addition/instead of rejection rate to gauge 
credit conditions. A decrease indicates that conditions 
are loosening 
SMELDLA 
5. Total SME non-
performing loans
Used as an indication of the SME performance and 
market conditions 
SMETNPL 
6. Number of approved
loans
Used as an indication of level of market penetration 
APPLNS 
7. Number of disbursed
loans/Number of
approved loans









Used as an indication of investment committee risk 
appetite 
AVEDISLAMT 
Source: Adapted from OECD, 2015 
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Table 4: Core Financial Impact Indicators per DFI on a South African, Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Global level 




Determines if DFI loan performance is riskier 
than countries’ loan performance.  
DFINPLSA 
2. DFI’s non-performing loans/
Sub-Saharan Africa non-
performing loans
Determines if DFI loan performance is riskier 





Determines if DFI loan performance is riskier 
than world’s loan performance.  
DFINPLIN 
4.  Spread between DFI’s non-
performing loans % and South
Africa non-performing loans
%.
Tightness of credit conditions  ̶  indicates how 
closely DFIs risk sentiments correlate with South 
Africa. 
DFINPLSASP 
5.  Spread between DFI’s non-
performing loans % and Sub-
Saharan Africa non-performing
loans %.
Tightness of credit conditions  ̶  indicates how 
closely DFIs risk sentiments correlate with Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
DFINPLSSSP 
6.  Spread between DFI’s non-
performing loans % and the
world non-performing loans %.
Tightness of credit conditions  ̶  indicates how 
closely DFIs risk sentiments correlate with the 
world. 
DFINPLINSP 
Source: Adapted from OECD, 2015 
Table 5: Core Financial Impact Indicators per DFI in terms of startup funding 
Core Indicators What they Show Short name 
1. Does the DFI report start-up
funding performance metrics in
annual report (Yes/No)
Determines if DFI has identified start-up funding 
as a vital enough sector to require monitoring  
DFISU 
2. Value of start-ups
funded/Total value of loan
approvals
Determines if DFI fund a sufficient % of start-
up; this has a potential impact on economic 
growth.  
SUFLA 
3.  Start-up non-performing
loans/total SME non-performing
loans
Determines if start-ups loan performance is 
riskier than total SME loan performance.  
SUMPLTNPL 
Source: Adapted from OECD, 2015 
This research paper aims to outline the past performance of the DFIs based on the indicators 
outlined above. One of the biggest challenges when analysing DFIs for improved financial 
access is the availability of information in order to compile these indicators. These indicators 
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are used to develop descriptive analysis results in order to outline the changes in financial 
access but most importantly to provide an indication of the risk appetite of the DFIs based on 
the limited information available. From these indicators key independent explanatory 
variables were selected to develop the regression model outlined in the next chapter which 
formed the basis of the quantitative analysis of these DFIs. The results obtained from the 
qualitative and quantitative analysis conducted were then interpreted in the data analysis 
section in terms of how the results addressed the hypotheses outlined in this research paper. 
It is important to note that the classification of a startup for the context of this research paper 
is regarded as an enterprise that has operated for less than one year at the time of funding 
approval or never operated at all. The set of core indicators based on available information 
are used to evaluate the performance of the DFIs based on financial access and risk appetite. 
3.3 Business Partners (BP) 
Business Partners is a South African specialist risk finance company with a national and 
African footprint. Business Partners provides customised financial solutions, mentorship and 
other added-value services focused on formal SMEs. Business Partners is inherently a private 
finance institution and in the context of this research paper, Business Partners is regarded as a 
Development Finance Institutions due to its focus on providing financial solutions to SMEs, 
its facilitation of wealth creation, job creation and economic development elements define it 
as a DFI. Business Partners’ Vision is “To live our name, being the premier business partner 
for small and medium enterprises, facilitation wealth creation, job creation and shared 
economic development” (Business Partners Limited [BP], 2016).Business Partner’s Mission 
is “To invest capital, skill and knowledge into viable entrepreneurial enterprises in South 
Africa, Africa and all markets where we have a presence” (BP, 2016). 
Business Partners, like other DFIs in this study, provides various financial and non-financial 
products and services but for the scope of this study, the focus will only be placed on its 
direct lending services to SMEs. Business Partners’ role as a DFI is to address certain market 
failures and challenges experienced by SMEs with the products and services to address 
Access to finance; Access to business expertise and resources; Access to non-financial 
support; Access to information, know-how, learning opportunities and Networking 
opportunities. 
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Business Partners was selected as one of the DFIs to be analysed due to it being a privately 
funded DFI but most importantly, due to the fact that Business Partners’ risk model is 
regarded as one of the best SME financing models in South Africa and the rest of Africa. 
Business Partners finances enterprises with an amount ranging from R500, 000 up to R50 
million. Business Partners has a network of more than 20 offices across South Africa, and has 
disbursed in excess of R16,5 billion in funding since it commenced operations in 1981 (BP, 
2016). From the three DFIs selected for this research paper, Business Partners is the oldest 
and best-performing DFI based on the date of establishment and sustainability in terms of 
self-sustainability through self-generated returns. 
3.3.1 Risk Appetite Framework of Business Partners 
Based on the analysis of the 2015 and 2016 financial report from Business Partners, it is 
challenging to determine their Risk Appetite Framework without gaining access to the 
funding institution's internal credit policy records.  
A formal risk assessment process is undertaken when investments are made and thus access 
to this process will provide insight into the institutions RAF. 
 Currently, Business Partners limits their investment exposure to not more the 0.9% of
their total investment portfolio in order to limit concentration risk from a single
investment (BP, 2016).
 Business Partners mitigates credit risk through securing collateral for investments made.
 Interest rate risk is mitigated by property investments (BP, 2016).
 Maintain adequate cash reserves (BP, 2016).
3.4 National Empowerment Fund (NEF) 
The National Empowerment Fund (NEF) is a state ̵owned South African DFI established as a 
result of the National Empowerment Fund Act No 105 of 1998. The NEF was established to 
be a key driver in promoting and facilitating black economic participation through the 
provision of financial and non-financial support to black empowered business. The NEF is 
governed by the Public Finance Management Act, National Treasury regulations and the 
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King III. The NEF is a government-owned DFI with a role to support Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (BB-BEE) (National Empowerment Fund, 2015). 
The NEF implements its mandate through three main channels: asset management, fund 
management and strategic project funds. The NEF’s mission is to address market failures 
through the provision of certain products and services: funding of between R250,000 and R75 
million for startups, expansion and equity transformation purposes as well as use of 
concessionary facilities; online business planning solution and dedicated mentorship support; 
competitive cost of finance with a higher risk appetite as well as requirement for operational 
involvement (sweat-capital) reduces the need for collateral payment; online business planning 
solution, dedicated mentorship support and technical assistance; online business planning 
solution with a module for financial projections and mentorship support; linkages and 
emphasis on the implementation of the Codes of Good Practice (BB-BEE) and linkages with 
off-takers (NEF, 2015) 
The NEF has a national footprint with offices located in every South African province. The 
NEF mandate just like other DFIs requires it to operate within a high-risk environment which 
can lead to assumptions that high-risk environments result in high interest rates. Based on 
these assumptions, NEF’s risk appetite level should be reflective of its environment and 
target market and thus this research paper aims to determine if the risk appetite of NEF is 
reflective of its mandate and target market or whether its risk appetite is reflective of a low 
risk appetite institution which is contrary to what is required by its target market and 
mandate. NEF provides financial and non-financial products and services to its target market 
and for the purposes of this research paper, the focus will only be on the funding of SMEs 
and startups. 
It is interesting to note that the NEF’s risk appetite framework is subject to change based on 
the lack of clarity regarding next sources of funding in terms of fund recapitalisation. 
Therefore the interpretation of the NEF’s risk appetite level should take into consideration the 
uncertainty regarding recapitalisation which has a direct impact on the NEF’s sustainability 
(NEF, 2014). 
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3.4.1 Risk Appetite Framework of National Empowerment Fund 
The NEF similar to Business Partners utilises an enterprise-wide risk management process to 
identify and mitigate against potential risks to the financial institution. The NEF’s Enterprise 
Risk Management methodology is based on the following interrelating components: internal 
environment; objective setting; risk identification; risk assessment; risk control and response; 
risk monitoring, reporting and risk performance measurement (NEF, 2015). In terms of Risk 
Appetite and Tolerance, the NEF has not been able to determine its acceptable levels of risk 
due to lack of clarity regarding the NEF’s future capitalisation (NEF, 2015). With this fact at 
hand, it becomes even more important to analyse data to be secured from the NEF in order to 
determine the NEF’s risk appetite based on the past performance and whether their 
performance is in line with their mandate and objectives as well as comparability to other 
DFIs in the study. 
The NEF highlights four key strategic objectives underpinned by key performance indicators 
(KPIs): advancing BBBEE; maximising the empowerment dividend; optimising non-financial 
support and financial efficiency and sustainability (NEF, 2015). These strategic objectives 
form the basis of the NEF’s risk appetite statement. The NEF has key performance indicators 
linked to each strategic objective used by the institution for performance monitoring 
purposes. The strategic objectives and key performance indicators are taken from the NEF 
2015 annual report. Advancing BBBEE KPI’s provide information on finance provided to 
black managed enterprises funded by the NEF: Value of deals approved; Value of new 
Commitments and Value of deals disbursed. 
Maximising the empowerment dividend KPIs provide information on the level of investments 
in high job creating black empowered enterprises, black women participation and facilitation 
of investment on a national scale. Specifically: Jobs created or maintained; Percentage of 
portfolio owned by black women and Maintain/Increase percentages of portfolio by value 
invested in Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Western Cape, Kwa-Zulu Natal, North West, 
Mpumalanga, Free State and Limpopo province. Optimising non-financial support KPIs 
provide information on social economic development focusing on savings, investments, black 
economic participation, empowerment and the development of the NEF brand. KPIs: Number 
of Investor Education seminars held across the country; Number of Business Today Training 
sessions provided; Number of entrepreneurs referred for business incubation; Number of 
social facilitation sessions held with investees and Brand audit survey findings. 
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Financial efficiency and sustainability KPIs provide information on the NEFs sustainability 
specifically percentage of portfolio impaired, target ROI before impairments, collections 
ratios and management portfolio risk. 
3.5 Small Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA) 
The Small Enterprise Finance Agency, a state-owned DFI known as SEFA, was established 
in 2012 as a result of a merger of three government institutions namely: The South African 
Microfinance Apex Fund, Khula Enterprise Finance Ltd and the small business activities of 
the Industrial Development Corporation (SEFA, 2015). SEFA has a national footprint of nine 
provincial regional centres with additional satellite offices in less urban environments.  
SEFA’s mandate is to be the leading catalyst for the development of SMEs and cooperatives 
through the provision of finance (SEFA, 2015). SEFA’s Mission is to provide access to 
finance to SMEs and cooperatives by: Delivering wholesale and direct lending; Providing 
credit guarantees to Small, Medium and Micro businesses; Supporting the institutional 
strengthening of Financial Intermediaries so that they can be effective in assisting SMEs; 
Creating strategic partnerships with a range of institutions for sustainable SMEs development 
and support; Monitoring the effectiveness and impact of our financing, credit guarantee and 
capacity development activities; Developing (through partnerships) innovative finance 
products, tools and channels to catalyse increased market participation in the provision of 
affordable finance (SEFA, 2015). 
In a survey commissioned by SEFA and conducted by an independent assessor, certain 
challenges and attributes experienced by SEFA were highlighted with some being reflective 
of the risk appetite of SEFA. Findings from the survey were disclosed on the 9
th
 of March
2016 to the Portfolio Committee on Small Business Development highlighting the following 
challenges experienced by SEFA: Unrealistic requirements and time consuming 
documentation; Stringent application processes; Lack of clarity and knowledge about 
business sectors; No proper feedback and or no feedback at all on declination of applications; 
Poor turnaround times; High interest rates; High administration fees; Inadequate repayment 
period; Insufficient funds available to clients; Profit-driven and not customer-driven and too 
much red tape (SEFA, 2016) 
39 
The challenges above highlight and support an interesting trend regarding DFIs where SMEs 
sentiment is that the DFIs are seen to be profit driven and not development driven and thus 
interest rates are regarded to be higher than expected for  DFIs even when taking into 
consideration the high-risk nature of the enterprises being funded. These sentiments highlight 
the need to analyse SEFA’s risk appetite taking into consideration its mandate and target 
market in order to ascertain if indeed SEFA’s performance in terms of startup approvals is 
reflective of a pro-development funding approach which is reflected in a higher risk appetite 
or if SEFAs performance is reflective of a low risk appetite institution which is risk averse to 
funding startups. SEFA provides a number of financial and non-financial services but for the 
purpose of this research study, the focus will be placed on the direct SME lending division 
with specific emphasis being placed on the funding of startups.  
3.5.1 Risk Appetite Framework of Small Enterprise Finance Agency. 
SEFA follows their Risk appetite which is set at board level. SEFA follows a process of 
credit risk grading which is used to determine the different client risk levels presented to the 
institutions. This grading classification process is based on a 17-grade scale and a default 
grade which is used to determine the risk level posed by clients and then integrated to 
determine the discounted credit risk charge. This is the basis of SEFA’s pricing methodology. 
Similar to Business Partners and NEF, SEFA also considers collateral from its client in order 
to mitigate risk levels. This includes own contribution, covering bonds and personal 
suretyships from clients (SEFA, 2015). In SEFA’s strategic plan, two strategic objectives and 
three strategic enablers are outlined which have KPIs aligned to them in order to monitor 
organisational performance.  
Strategic objective 1 focuses on increasing access and providing finance to SMEs thus 
contributing to job creation (SEFA, 2016). The KPIs from SEFA (2016) are as follow: 
Expand direct lending through partnerships in all provinces; Introduce innovative 
programmes to expand access to cost-effective microenterprise credit; Establish stronger 
partnerships with institutions to increase access to finance for SMEs and co-operatives; and 
Increase the utilisation of the Credit Guarantee Scheme by both banks and other partners. 
Strategic objective 2 focuses on building an effective and efficient sefa that is sustainable and 
performance driven (SEFA, 2016). The KPIs from SEFA (2016) are as follow: Create, 
40 
develop and retain dynamic human capital with values and culture aligned to SEFA’s 
mandate; Build an effective SEFA with robust and efficient business process, systems and 
infrastructure; and Build a financially sustainable and viable SEFA. 
Strategic enabler 1 focuses on building a learning organisation (SEFA, 2016). The key 
performance enablers (KPE) from SEFA (2016) are as follow: Develop and implement 
dynamic research and development capacity; and Develop effective SEFA monitoring, 
evaluation and knowledge management system and practices. Strategic enabler 2 focuses on 
building a SEFA that meets all legislative, regulatory and good governance requirements 
(SEFA, 2016). The KPE from SEFA (2016) is: Ensure an effectively governed and compliant 
organisation. Strategic enabler 3 focuses on building a strong and effective SEFA brand 
(SEFA, 2016). The KPE from SEFA (2016) is: Develop and implement an effective 
marketing and promotion programme to communicate SEFA’s product offering to SMEs and 
co-operatives. 
3.6 The effectiveness of the three selected DFIs in improving access to finance  
To assess the three DFIs in terms of improvements in access to finance, the core indicators 
outlined in the three indicator tables above are used. The core indicators were assessed over a 
5 year period for this study and the performance of the three DFIs were outlined in the figures 
below. 
Figure 2: Portfolio structure Figure 3: Short t̵erm loans over Long̵ 
term loans 
Source: Author Source: Author 
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Between the three DFIs, Business Partners has the highest percentage of long-term loans in 
its portfolio at 84.54% in the 2014/2015 financial period. This is followed by NEF at 68.81% 
and SEFA at 52.47% in the 2014/2015 financial period. It is also interesting to note that out 
of the three DFIs, Business Partners is the only DFI that has consistently maintained this 
credit allocation over the 5 year period whereas NEF experienced a downward trend. SEFA, 
in contrast, experienced a significant growth in long-term loan allocation from 13.78% in the 
2012/2013 financial period since its inception.  
For short-term loans, Business Partners has maintained its percentage allocation with it 
reaching 15.46% in the 2014/2015 financial period from 13.94% in the 2010/2011 period 
whereas NEF experienced a growth from 10.51% in the 2010/2011 period to 31.19% in the 
2014/2015 period. SEFA, in contrast, experienced a decline in the percentage of short-term 
loans from 86.22% in the 2012/2013 period to 47.53% in the 2014/2015 period. In terms of 
access to finance, findings show that SEFA has the highest percentage allocated to short-term 
loans compared to Business Partners and NEF. This indicates that SEFA in terms of 
improved financial access to the higher risk SME sector is the most progressive while 
Business Partners and NEF are more conservative and focused more on longer-term loans 
which are less likely to be secured by startup enterprises. This is supported by the percentage 
of short-terms loans over the long ̵term loans figure which shows that SEFA has a higher 
percentage portfolio allocation of loan products that are more securable by startup 
enterprises. 
Figure 4: Loans disbursed/approved    Figure 5: Non-performing loans % 
Source: Author Source: Author 
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In terms of disbursements against loan approvals, 2014/2015 findings reveal that SEFA has 
the highest percentage of loans disbursed against loans approved which indicates that SEFA 
is the most aggressive DFI.  This exposes the more conservative approach of the NEF and 
Business Partners who disburse a lower percentage of approved loans indicating a higher 
level of risk averseness post approval. This higher aggressive approach is reflected in the 
percentage of non-performing loans with SEFA over the entire assessment period 
experiencing the highest percentage. 
Figure 6: Approved loans    Figure 7: Disbursed/approved loans 
Source: Author Source: Author 
With regards to the number of loans approved as well as disbursed loans as a percentage of 
approved loans, Figure 6 and 7 shows that Business Partners is the most progressive out of 
the three DFIs with SEFA a close second. In terms of future trends, it is evident that SEFA 
will surpass Business Partners if it maintains its current trajectory. Of the three DFIs, 
Business Partners approved the most loans for SMEs followed by SEFA and then NEF. 
Unfortunately NEF had a moratorium on new loan applications post in 2013 but it is evident 
that in terms of financial access based on the number of loans Business Partners is the most 
effective of the three DFIs. It is however important to note the downward trend of Business 
Partners, where it does not approve as many loans as it used to, whereas SEFA has increased 
its number of loans aggressively. 
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Figure 8: Average loan amounts  Figure 9: RSA Non performing loans 
Source: Author Source: Author 
It is interesting to note that even though the NEF does not approve as many loans as Business 
Partners and SEFA, NEF has the highest average approved loan amount which is 100% more 
than Business Partners and SEFA which could provide insight into why the NEF does not 
approve as many loans as Business Partners and SEFA.  
Figure 10: Global non-performing loans Figure 11: Sub-Saharan non-
performing loans 
Source: Author Source: Author 
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DATE DFISU (BP) DFISU (NEF) DFISU (SEFA)
2010/2011 YES NO NO
2011/2012 NO NO NO
2012/2013 NO NO NO
2013/2014 NO NO NO
2014/2015 NO NO NO
Figure 12: RSA non-performing loans spread Figure 13: Sub-Sahara non-   
performing loans spread 
Source: Author Source: Author 
SEFA’s aggressiveness in finance provision in this high-risk SME sector is reflected by its 
non-performing loan percentage with SEFA experiencing the highest percentage when 
compared to the South African bank sector, Sub-Saharan Africa and Global credit markets. 
Even though this is a concern from the SEFA’s internal perspective, it is supportive of their 
objective of improved access to finance taking into consideration the high-risk sector they 
operate in. 
Figure 14: RSA Global non-performing Figure 15: Startup metrics disclosure 
loans spread     
Source: Author Source: Author 
In terms of improving financial access to the SME market and startup enterprises, findings 
show that SEFA is the most aggressive of the three DFIs with SEFA taking the most risks 
considering that  it is the smallest of the three DFIs. With regards to the overall assessment of 
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the three DFIs, it is positive to note that all three DFIs have positively improved access to 
finance for the SME sector.  However, based on limited information available, it cannot be 
determined how effective they have been in terms of startup enterprises. It is evident that out 
of the three DFIs, SEFA is the best performing DFI over the study period in terms of 
providing finance to the SME sector and most importantly the provision of financial products 
largely required by startup enterprises which are short-term loans. Taking into consideration 
the challenges experienced by the SME sector and specifically startup enterprises, SEFA 
ranks number 1 in terms of its effectiveness in improving financial access to SMEs and 
startup enterprises. Taking note of this, it becomes even more important to determine the 
different risk appetite levels of the DFIs taking into consideration their determinants as this 
will provide further insight into how to improve access to finance.  
3.7 Startup, small and medium enterprises: Definition and Challenges 
South African startups which can also be categorised as newly registered SMEs or enterprises 
which have been in operation for less than twelve months are reported to have a high failure 
rate which is underpinned by access to finance constraints or the lack thereof (Fanta et al., 
2015). A 2016 study conducted by the Bureau for Economic Research on behalf of the Small 
Enterprise Development Agency found eight key challenges experienced by SMEs which 
hinder growth and development of these enterprises including: 
Access to finance and credit 
Access to finance and credit is a serious challenge for SMEs especially startups due to the 
high-risk profile associated to such applicants by banks. This high associated risk profile 
based on: inadequate collateral which can be provided by SMEs to lending institutions; lack 
of credit history which results in high levels of information asymmetry; lack of 
comprehensive business plans which included detailed market research based on a 
sustainable and viable business concept and the lack of access to markets (GEM, 2014). 
Therefore in order for access to finance and credit market failure to be addressed, DFIs with 
high-risk appetite are required to mitigate and support enterprises seeking improved access to 
finance. With innovative financial products, DFIs are able to address this challenge through 
financial intermediation such as the provision of guarantees or unsecured loans. 
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Poor infrastructure 
Poor infrastructure is a key impediment to SMEs seeking improved access to finance as the 
lack of infrastructure such as satellite offices and qualified financing personnel located closer 
to or in more rural areas would reduce transaction costs for both enterprises and financing 
institutions. Improved infrastructure is highlighted as a key enabler for startups and SMEs by 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor South Africa Report of 2014. Infrastructure which 
includes the availability of municipal services, access to transportation, availability of 
cheaper or affordable business premises and business-related services is vital to the creation 
of a supportive environment for SMEs. The lack of sufficient infrastructure negatively 
impacts access to finance as a result of increased transaction costs for SMEs and financial 
institutions when considering provision and monitoring of finance and credit transactions. 
The existence of inadequate infrastructure creates an environment where only financial 
institutions with a high risk appetite such as DFIs can operate within. 
Low levels of research and development 
Research and development is a key driver of economic development where innovative ideas 
play a catalytic role in economic growth. With high levels of research and development, 
SMEs are able to reduce transaction costs which leads to improved access to finance resulting 
in increased probability of economic growth underpinned by SMEs. Technological 
advancements incorporate a multiplier effect which results in increased growth rates for 
startup enterprises. Thus low levels of research and development negatively impacts financial 
institutions’ risk appetite levels as it creates an environment for high transaction costs 
resulting in lower access to finance.  
Onerous labour laws 
Laws of any country play a vital role in improving or hindering access to finance for 
economic development and South Africa is no exception. Labour laws particularly affect how 
SMEs and startups employ their workforce. Due to the instability of SMEs’ performance 
during the early years of development, labour laws that make it difficult to lay off employees 
due to unproductivity and other matters make it challenging for SMEs to employ as many 
employees as it could. The GEM 2014 notes how labour laws do not provide for economic 
downturns and underperforming market conditions in South Africa, including minimum wage 
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implications, resulting in SMEs finding it difficult to navigate the employment market thus 
effecting SMEs potential growth which impact startup growth. 
Inadequately educated workforce 
Skills shortage is noted as one of the leading factors contributing to South Africa’s 
unemployment rate with the National Development Plan highlighting how SMEs are 
negatively impacted by this shortage thus impeding economic development and growth. This 
shortage of skills directly impacts entrepreneurship potential thus having a negative knock-on 
effect on levels of access to finance and this is supported by the GEM 2015/2016 South 
Africa report which states the existence of a strong correlation between skills level and 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Inefficient government bureaucracy 
An enabling environment is critical for entrepreneurship to flourish. Policies of government 
form a vital part of this ecosystem as they provide the necessary platform for entrepreneurial 
activity. The GEM 2015/2016 South Africa report finds that South African government 
policies have been highlighted as one of the major hurdles for SME development. The lower 
than average entrepreneurship framework conditions score of South Africa supports the 
notion that even though much emphasis is placed by the government on the SME sector, 
government policies are inherently an impediment to SME development. 
High levels of crime 
Crime levels have a negative impact on SME development increasing costs being allocated to 
security by SMEs. This translates to increased transaction costs which result in overall 
increased costs of doing business. The increased transaction costs impacts on levels of 
investment which directly impacts development economy’s objective of increasing access to 
finance as a result of reduced investment flows. 
Lack of access to markets 
Access to markets is a key pre-requisite for access to finance and credit for SMEs. This 
challenge is particularly high for SMEs located in the rural areas which are disadvantaged 
when compared to their more urban SME counterparts and as a result are not able to be as 




Access to finance and credit was found to be one of the main reasons behind business failure 
underpinned by a lack of adequate collateral, lack of credit history and lack of appropriate 
documentation and records which are key to improved access to finance (BER, 2016).  
DFIs are managed by an operational executive team who are guided by the board of directors 
who are responsible for the development and outline of an effective Risk Appetite Statement 
which forms an essential part of the Risk Appetite Framework which is a core component of 
the institutions Enterprise Risk Management framework. In order for one to analyse an 
institutions loan portfolios’ past performance in the context of its Risk Appetite, an analysis 
of the loan portfolios Key Risk Indicator is vital in order to ascertain the trend of the loan 
portfolio which will serve as an indication which will assist in the determination of the DFIs 






This chapter focuses on the research methodology and data that was used for this research 
study. An unbalanced panel data methodology was selected due to the time-series and cross-
sectional nature of the data and its ability to address the hypotheses and research questions 
relating to “microeconomic dynamic behaviour” (Honore, 2002). The data was stacked or 
clustered around the three DFIs: Business Partners, the National Empowerment Fund and the 
Small Enterprise Finance Agency. These institutions were selected based on the 
organisational type, loan fund size, national presence and funding mandate. The past 
performance of the three DFIs, the local South African credit market, the regional sub-
Saharan credit market and the international credit markets were analysed using regression 
models. Section 4.2 outlines the collection, type and sources of data. In Section 4.3 the model 
specification is described and the selected variables defined followed by the analytical 
techniques in Section 4.4. This chapter is concluded by  Section 4.5 in which the 
limitation of the research methodology is highlighted but discussed further in the final 
chapter. 
4.2 Data collection, type and sources 
The data from this study is drawn from the 2010/2011 to 2014/2015 (5 years) financial 
periods. Annual data was utilised and collected directly from the DFIs annual financial 
reports. The data was limited to publicly available information. The intention of the data 
analysis was to determine: Individual DFI Risk Appetite, how DFIs ownership affects risk 
appetite and how DFIs loan exposure terms affect risk appetite. Data for the local, regional 
and international credit markets was sourced from the Global Financial Development 
Database which “is an extensive dataset of financial system characteristics for 206 
economies” developed by the World Bank. This database is in annual time series format with 
measures for size, efficiency, access and stability of financial institutions on an individual, 
regional and international basis. 
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4.3 Model Specification and definition of variables 
The research methodology adopted for this research paper took into consideration the number 
of key indicators identified which dictated the descriptive analysis and panel data analysis 
methodology used in this research paper.  
Baltagi (1998) refers to panel data as a data set that contains multiple variable observations 
from each sample or cluster unit. These data sets are generated through pooling or randomly 
sampling the observed time-series variables across three cross-sectional units, specifically the 
development finance institutions. 
Panel data analysis used in this study follows a simple regression function: 
yit = ẞ0 + αi + ẞ1x1,it + ẞ2x2,it +…+ ẞkxk,it + εit i = 1,..., N; t = 1,..,T         (1) 
Where αi  is individual specific. This model enabled the researcher to manage heterogeneity 
across individuals or clusters. This parameter was included in the model in order to address 
and explain the correlation between the observation in terms of time and can be fixed or 
treated like a random variable for each individual or cluster. The model above can be 
rewritten as follows: 
yit = X’it ẞ + µi + λt + vit i = 1,..., N; t = 1,..,T         (2) 
Where i denotes individuals/clusters/DFIs and t denotes time. Xit denotes a vector of variables 
or observations on k independent (explanatory) variables such as the observed variables 
identified later in this chapter. ẞ in the simple regression represents a k vector of unknown 
coefficients which reflect the impact the observed variables have on the dependent variable 
which is risk appetite. µi in this regression is an unobserved cluster/DFI specific effect, λt
represents an unobserved time specific effect. vit represents a zero means random disturbance 
with variance σ²v. The error components residuals of this regression model follow a two-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) (Baltagi, 1998).  
A major advantage about the use of panel data is that it does not require long time series 
information which makes it the ideal analytical technique to utilise in this research paper 
taking into consideration the limited data available. Another advantage supporting the use of 
panel data analysis is its ability to evaluate the impact the time-varying variables have on the 
dependent variable through cross section analysis. 
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The key variables for this research study and the data collected was analysed to determine the 
following core indicators which will be used in developing a regression function capable of 
addressing the hypotheses of this research paper through determining the risk appetite levels 
of the different DFIs.  
Based on the key indicators above as a core component of this research study, observations 
were collected from the key independent variables, where the variables were analysed using 
regression analysis in order to determine a regression model that would be fit and provide 
analysis for our hypothesis in question using the Risk appetite proxy variable as the 
dependent variable assigned to represent risk appetite.  
We let the dependent variable yit = RAit be the Risk Appetite percentage of the loan portfolio 
where i denotes the DFI and t denotes the year. In this research study, the Risk Appetite 
percentage of the different DFIs is modelled as a regression function incorporating certain 
observable independent variables.  
Two regression models were developed, the DFI specific Risk Appetite percentage function 
is: 
RAit = ẞ0 + ẞ1LTLEit + ẞ2STLEit + ẞ3TALAit + uit i = 1,..., N; t = 1,..,T    (3) 
where LTLE denotes long term loan exposure, STLE denotes short term loan exposure and 
TALA denotes total approved loans amount. In order to address possible variable omission 
bias, other independent variables were added and later removed in order to arrive at the 
regression equation 3 the final regression model. 
The pooled regression model for Risk Appetite is: 
RAit = ẞ0 + ẞ1LTLEit + ẞ2STLEit + ẞ3TALAit + ẞ4TNPLLGi,t-1 + ẞ5GDPGSALGi,t-1 + 
ẞ6DFIIDit + ẞ7DFITit + uit                  i = 1,..., N; t = 1,..,T    (4) 
Where the TNPLLG variable denotes the Total Non-performing Loans Lagged variable 
which is a proxy of the past financial periods’ portfolio performance and GDPGSALG is the 
lagged South African Gross Domestic Growth Rate variable which represents the 
macroeconomic performance of the local economy. The DFIID variable denotes the different 
DFIs. The DFIT variable denotes the DFIs ownership. 
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These key variables were identified through a theoretical and literature based method where 
indicator variables were observed and extrapolated in order to determine the DFIs risk 
appetite. From these indicator variables, an initial regression model was developed using four 
variables which resulted in a statistically significant regression model to be used as the basis 
for determining the DFIs risk appetite. Through this regression methodology, it was 
determined that insufficient data was available to determine the DFIs risk appetite, 
specifically towards funding startup enterprises. This lack of information or performance 
metrics from the resources available in itself provided ample insight into the various 
institution's appetite for risk when funding startups. 
The key variables identified for the regression models were: Long-term loan exposure 
(LTLE) was included as an independent variable used to indicate the amount of the DFIs 
portfolio is allocated to long-term loans which are regarded as higher risk products. LTLE 
encompasses term loans, instalment loans and structured finance and project finance products 
– all with a maturity of more than twelve months. LTLE in this study is a capital risk appetite
driver. 
Short-term loan exposure (STLE) was included as an independent variable used to indicate 
the amount of the DFIs’ portfolio is allocated to short term loans which are predominately 
perceived as a lower risk product due to its period of exposure for the development finance 
institution. STLE encompasses bridging loans, instalment loans, structured finance and 
project finance products ̶ all with a maturity of less than 12 months. STLE in this study is a 
capital risk appetite driver.  
Total Approved Loan Applications (TALA) was included as an independent variable used as 
a basis and to indicate the level of risk exposure the DFI is prepared to engage. TALA are all 
the loans approved in a given financial year and includes loan approvals of all four difference 
finance products. TALA, in this study, is an earnings risk appetite driver. 
Total Non-performing Loans – one year lagged term (TNPLLG), was included as an 
independent variable which is a variable which indicates the individual DFIs non-performing 
loans percentage for the period financial year. This variable represents the performance of the 
individual DFIs portfolio over the previous financial period. TNPLLG in this study is a risk 
confidence risk appetite driver. 
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Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate for South Africa – 1 year lagged term (GDPGSALG), 
was included as an independent variable which is a variable which reflects the South African 
economics performance over the previous financial period. GDPGSALG in this study is a 
market size risk appetite driver.  
Development Finance Institution Identity (DFIID), was introduced as a time-invariant fixed 
independent variable used to identify the different DFIs. DFIID is a cluster differentiating 
variable used to interpret differences in the three DFIs. 
Development Finance Institution Type (DFIT) was introduced as a time-invariant fixed 
independent variable which denotes the ownership of the different DFIs. DFIID is a cluster 
differentiating variable used to interpret ownership influence on risk appetite. 
Risk Appetite (RA), as the main focus of this research paper, was included as the dependent 
variable in the regression model.  
RA = 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔−𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒+𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡−𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
This variable is an extrapolated variable calculated by taking the total loan exposure of the 
DFI which combines the long-term loan exposure and short-term loan exposure and divides 
the total by the total approved loans or loan advances for the same period. The ratio 
calculated is then used as a proxy for Risk Appetite and herein the dependent variable. 
Variables which did not improve the regression model and thus were not included were: 
Number of approved loans (NAL); Average approved loans amount (AALA); Total disbursed 
loans amount (TDLA); Number of disbursed loans (NDL); Average disbursed loans amount 
(ADLA); Gross Domestic Product growth rate for Sub-Saharan Africa (GDPGSS); Gross 
Domestic Product Global growth rate (GDPGG); Non-performing loans percentage for South 
Africa (NPLSA); Non-performing loans percentage for Sub-Saharan Africa (NPLSS); and 
Global Non-performing loans (NPLG).  
4.4 Analytical (estimation) techniques 
The panel data analysis methodology used has two estimation techniques, Fixed effect and 
Random effects. If µi and λt represent or denote fixed parameters to be analysed, this 
regression model is called a fixed effect regression model. The fixed effect regression model 
assumes that the Xit variables are independent of the vit for all i and t.  
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Fixed effect is used when the research is interested in analysing the impact of certain 
variables that change over time. Fixed effect methodology is consistent when the error term 
and the independent variable (explanatory variable) are correlated, which results in the 
random effects methodology being inconsistent in this case. 
If the µi and λt represent random variables which have zero means and constant variances σ²µ 
and σ²λ, this regression model is known as the random effects model. This model assumes that 
µi, λt and vit  are conditionally independent (Baltagi, B. 1998). The random effects model is 
estimated using the generalised least squares (GLS) technique. The random effects model can 
estimate time-invariant and individual or cluster invariant variables. 
The study utilises the random effects technique based on dependent and independent 
variables identified which are quantitative and qualitative which assumes that variation across 
entities is random and uncorrelated with the independent variable. The random effects model 
is also appropriate due to the expected existence of heteroscedasticity. This assumes the error 
term is not correlated with the independent variable allowing for time-invariant variables 
such as gender or DFI to play a role as explanatory variables (Torres-Reyna, O. 2007).  
It must be noted that the use of the random effects technique when the appropriate technique 
to have been used is the fixed effects technique will result in inconsistent estimates. The fixed 
effect technique results in consistent estimates when used appropriately. The random effects 
technique is regarded as more efficient than the fixed effect technique if it is used 
appropriately and results in the best linear unbiased estimates (Sheytanonva, 2014). In the 
case where the fixed effect technique is not the technique to be used and the random effects 
technique is not the appropriate technique either, the pooled model technique is to be used. 
A generalised multilevel modelling function as the basis for this regression was assumed 
based on theory and literature with the following linear modelling framework which was 
selected:  
[Level – 1 Equation] Yij = ẞ0j + ẞ1X1ij + ẞ2X2ij + eij (3a) 
[Level – 2 Equation] ẞ0j = y00 + y01Z1j + u0j (3b) 
When rewriting equation 1a and 1b in a reduced-form by substituting equation 3b level-2 
equation into the level-1 equation when have: 
  Yij = y00 + ẞ1X1ij + ẞ2X2ij + y01Z1j + u0j + eij  (3c) 
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i: represents measurement occasions (indexes level-1 units). 
j:  represents individual or countries or development finance institutions 
(indexes level-2 units). 
X1ij and X2ij: time-varying variable for panel and TSCS data and an individual-
level variable in multilevel data. 
Zij: represents a level-2 variable which is time-constant (or 
country/individual/DFI-specific) variable in panel data and time-series 
cross-sectional data and a contextual variable in multilevel data. 
eij: represents a level-1 error term, random term assumed to be normally 
distributed with a mean of zero and an estimable variance. 
u0j: represents unobserved heterogeneity across clusters. 
In panel data analysis and time-series cross-sectional data analysis, N represents the number 
of cross-sectional units and T represents time points, in multilevel representation above, N 
represents cross-sectional units are level-2 units and T represents the cluster sizes for each 
cluster (Bartels, BL. 2008).  
The inclusion of the variables ẞ0j and  u0j in the equation above “allows the conditional means 
of the dependent variable to vary across level-2 units for unobserved reasons” (Bartels, BL. 
2008). It is also important to note how the level-2 equation “allows for the varying intercept 
to be explained by observed Zij and unobserved heterogeneity u0j. 
It is important that assumptions of the above equation are not violated as this will impact on 
parameters and result in biased estimates. Taking into consideration the dynamics concerned, 
the following regression function accounts for dynamics using lagged dependent variable. 
  Yij = y00 + ẞ1X1ij + ẞ2X2ij + ẞ3Yij(t-1) + y01Z1j + u0j + eij (4) 
Cluster confounding is a critical issue that has to be addressed when selecting the appropriate 
model and approach to adopt the data. Cluster confounding “occurs when a level-1 variable 
exhibits distinct within-cluster and between-cluster effects, yet one only includes the original 
level-1 variable in the model without distinguishing these two types of variation in the 
variable” (Bartels, BL. 2008). This results in the within and between cluster effects being 
confounded into a single averages effect represented both within and between cluster effects 
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(Bartels, BL. 2008).  Cluster confounding significantly affects the interpretation of the 
resulting effects of independent variables in the clustered data and it is thus critical to address 
cluster confounding in order to properly interpret the variable relationships and for hypothesis 
testing (Bartels, BL. 2008). It must be noted that cluster confounding is not an issue when 
within and between cluster effects of a level-1 variable are the same. 
The selected data observed due to its cluster nature had the potential of displaying 
heterogeneity and homogeneity trends among certain variables. In particular the expectation 
that systematic differences in the Risk Appetite percentage of the different DFIs would exist 
due to differences between the DFIs based on their donor/sponsor, mandates, their enterprise 
risk management framework and other cluster specific factors. 
It was hypothesised that there would be differences in the risk appetite of the different DFIs 
enabling the ranking of the different DFIs in terms of their risk appetite. Additionally, based 
on the development nature of these DFIs and the high risk enterprise funding sector they 
operate within, it was expected that there would be differences in the Risk Appetite 
percentage of the DFIs over time due to changes in the enterprise risk management strategy 
of the DFIs as a result of local, regional and global economic performance. Taking into 
consideration the development mandate and key development indicators outlined by these 
DFIs it was reasonably assumed that the funding and monitoring metrics of approved SME 
and startup enterprise loans would be disclosed or publicly available enabling a statistical 
analysis of the different DFIs funding of startups taking into consideration their risk appetite 
levels. 
These changes in independent variables were expected to affect the dependent variable by (1) 
the level of risk appetite and (2) the responsiveness of the risk appetite of the DFIs to changes 
in the explanatory variables. The explanatory variables used to develop the key core 
indicators are determined based on data collected which forms the basis of the regression 
analysis conducted on the data. The analysis results from the data will assist in determining 
the Risk Appetite level of the individual DFIs and provide insight into the research questions. 
The data collected will be used to calculate the core indicators which will be used to develop 
the Risk Appetite regression models which shall be used to address the key research 
questions and objectives. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Data analysis and interpretation of results for this research paper was challenging due to 
limited data availability but still insightful in terms of the risk appetite of the different DFIs 
and their funding of startups. In the next chapter, we analyse and interpret the descriptive 
analysis and the results from the regression model developed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
5.1 Introduction 
This section of this research study outlines the descriptive data analysis conducted and the 
regression data analysis conducted using the regression model outlined in the previous 
chapter. In order for the data selected and the results gathered from the variables and error 
terms analysis, the estimators of the regression coefficients and the error terms need to be 
independent and unbiased. In order for the results obtained and the interpretations resulting 
from this data to be of significance, the data and model need to be tested to ensure that it 
overcomes model biasness. These tests are focused on testing the validity of the model, 
testing the strength of the relationship that may exist between the variables and testing the 
strength of this relationship between two or more variables. These tests will address 
challenges resulting from the existence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation which if 
present can violate the regression model assumptions. These tests will be outlined in more 
detail in the following sections prior to the results and research study findings section. 
5.2 Descriptive Data Analysis 
5.2.1 Variable and portfolio summary statistics 
Initial analysis of the dependent variable RA and the independent variables: LTLE, STLE, 
TALA, TNPLLG, GDPGSALG, DFIID and DFIT was conducted and the summary statistics 
resulted as follows: 
Table 6: Summary statistics (Qualitative Data) 
Summary statistics (Qualitative data):
Variable Categories Counts Frequencies %
DFIID BP 4 4 40.000
NEF 4 4 40.000
SEFA 2 2 20.000
DFIT POC 4 4 40.000
SOE 6 6 60.000
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Table 7: Risk Appetite Descriptive Analysis Summary 
A descriptive analysis of the risk appetite (RA) variable was conducted. Table 7 above tables 
the descriptive analysis of the risk appetite of all three DFIs. Analysis was conducted on the 
three variables including a pooled data analysis as an industry proxy. The mean of Business 
Partners’ risk appetite reflected the lowest mean among the three institutions with NEF 
having the highest mean risk appetite over the 2011 to 2015 period. When interpreted against 
the pooled risk appetite, Business Partners has a lower mean risk appetite in relation to the 
pooled risk appetite mean and NEF and SEFA has a higher risk appetite than the industry 
(pooled data). It is positive to note that based on the descriptive analysis, that all DFIs in this 
research study maintained a positive risk appetite which positively impacted on the growth of 
all the DFI loan portfolios. 
 The standard error, Standard deviation, as well as the sample variance for Business Partners 
was the smallest amongst all of the DFIs even against the industry proxy. This indicates that 
Business Partners is the most consistent DFI in terms of the lower volatility of their risk 
appetite. This also provides insight into how less influenced by exogenous variables Business 
Partners’ risk appetite is towards funding enterprises. This is also supported by the range in 
terms of the volatility parameters of their risk appetite but this can also mean that Business 
Partners is less likely to adapt its risk appetite based on exogenous industry challenges thus 
further emphasising how Business Partners is the more sustainable and consistent institution 
compared to the other two DFIs and against the industry proxy. 
RA RABP RANEF RASEFA RA (Pooled)
Mean 0.481999 0.749494 0.748117 0.646293359
Standard Error 0.018383 0.145635 0.082059 0.066538567
Median 0.474672 0.89484 0.726356 0.544442831
Mode #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Standard Deviation 0.041105 0.32565 0.142131 0.239908215
Sample Variance 0.00169 0.106048 0.020201 0.057555952
Kurtosis -0.63562 -1.18985 #DIV/0! -0.992086531
Skewness 0.301997 -0.79853 0.672828 0.442088298
Range 0.106383 0.781332 0.281751 0.781331649
Minimum 0.431643 0.283342 0.618122 0.283341965
Maximum 0.538025 1.064674 0.899874 1.064673614
Sum 2.409994 3.747468 2.244352 8.401813667
Count 5 5 3 13
Largest(1) 0.538025 1.064674 0.899874 1.064673614
Smallest(1) 0.431643 0.283342 0.618122 0.283341965
Confidence Level(95.0%) 0.051039 0.404348 0.353072 0.144975083
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The kurtosis for all institutions except SEFA due to insufficient data exhibited a platykurtic 
distribution or light tails, all with a kurtosis less than 0. Skewness results indicate that the risk 
appetite of Business Partners is fairly symmetrical compared to NEF and SEFA which are 
moderately skewed. With such a small sample size, the interpretation of the kurtosis and 
skewness results for risk appetite have a level of bias.  
Table 8: Total Approved Loan Amount Descriptive Analysis Summary 
Table 8 above outlines the descriptive analysis results for the observed independent variable, 
Total Approved Loan Amounts, for the stated research period. Out of all three institutions, 
Business Partners has the highest mean total approval amount which indicates that Business 
Partners has the largest assets or funds available for funding compared to NEF and SEFA 
which has the lowest total approved loan amount. Compared to the pooled result, Business 
Partners and NEF can be regarded as the larger two institutions compared to SEFA. Business 
Partners’ total approved loan amount variable exhibited the lowest standard deviation and 
sample variance support. Earlier indications showed that Business Partners is the most 
consistent institution in terms of maintaining high levels of total approved loan amounts. It is 
interesting to note that even though Business Partners has the largest total approved loan 
amounts over the period, its range is the smallest which indicates limited volatility in terms of 
total approved loan amount compared to NEF which has the highest range and standard 
deviation which can be explained in part due to the moratorium on funding experience by 
NEF during the 2013 to 2014 period. 
TALA TALABP TALANEF TALASEFA TALA (Pooled)
Mean 1,018,860,000.00 911,380,000.00 340,000,000.00 820,861,538.46
Standard Error 51,218,645.04 159,658,586.99 105,305,903.60 99,983,609.26
Median 1,009,300,000.00 895,000,000.00 366,000,000.00 895,000,000.00
Mode #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Standard Deviation 114,528,372.03 357,007,453.70 182,395,175.37 360,496,029.89
Sample Variance 1.31167E+16 1.27454E+17 3.3268E+16 1.29957E+17
Kurtosis -1.039530542 -0.678039178 #DIV/0! -0.740380666
Skewness 0.423153282 -0.308324868 -0.628429891 -0.52997513
Range 286,000,000.00 914,100,000.00 362,000,000.00 1,186,500,000.00
Minimum 891,000,000.00 418,400,000.00 146,000,000.00 146,000,000.00
Maximum 1,177,000,000.00 1,332,500,000.00 508,000,000.00 1,332,500,000.00
Sum 5,094,300,000.00 4,556,900,000.00 1,020,000,000.00 10,671,200,000.00
Count 5 5 3 13
Largest(1) 1,177,000,000.00 1,332,500,000.00 508,000,000.00 1,332,500,000.00
Smallest(1) 891,000,000.00 418,400,000.00 146,000,000.00 146,000,000.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 142,205,756.32 443,283,302.35 453,094,733.59 217,845,570.61
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Table 9: Long-term Loan Exposure Descriptive Analysis Summary 
Long-term loan exposure, an observed independent variable, provides insight into the DFIs 
willingness to be exposure to long-term risk through provided long-term loans. Among all 
three DFIs, Business Partners is the only institution that has the highest mean long-term loan 
exposure and the only institution which has a long-term loan exposure higher than the pooled 
industry proxy. This indicates that either Business Partners has the most confidence in its 
long-term loan portfolio’s performance which explain its willingness to incur such above 
industry exposure or that the indication is biased due portfolio size. Based on Business 
Partners consistency in terms of performance over this period, it was interesting to note that 
NEF had the lowest standard deviation and sample variance of the three institutions which 
may imply that of the three institutions, NEF may be the institution that has more intentions 
of maintaining a high long-term loan exposure other than Business Partners and in last rank 
SEFA which has the largest standard deviation and sample variance. Due to the small sample 
size, the significance of the variables above are detailed in the regression analysis section 
which takes into consideration their data assumptions and restrictions. 
LTLE LTLEBP LTLENEF LTLESEFA LTLE (Pooled)
Mean 1,802,048,600.00 950,595,982.00 234,923,666.67 1,112,922,608.46
Standard Error 68,516,738.88 67,683,497.99 118,314,833.80 180,603,895.13
Median 1,740,888,000.00 1,004,124,287.00 251,174,000.00 1,020,961,208.00
Mode #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Standard Deviation 153,208,085.73 151,344,902.45 204,927,303.43 651,176,604.45
Sample Variance 2.34727E+16 2.29053E+16 4.19952E+16 4.24031E+17
Kurtosis -2.208236186 -1.193751479 #DIV/0! -1.163051158
Skewness 0.100359285 -0.346786533 -0.354597295 -0.175259564
Range 353,986,000.00 382,068,025.00 408,887,000.00 1,946,085,000.00
Minimum 1,614,454,000.00 749,086,331.00 22,355,000.00 22,355,000.00
Maximum 1,968,440,000.00 1,131,154,356.00 431,242,000.00 1,968,440,000.00
Sum 9,010,243,000.00 4,752,979,910.00 704,771,000.00 14,467,993,910.00
Count 5 5 3 13
Largest(1) 1,968,440,000.00 1,131,154,356.00 431,242,000.00 1,968,440,000.00
Smallest(1) 1,614,454,000.00 749,086,331.00 22,355,000.00 22,355,000.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 190,232,964.29 187,919,516.69 509,067,642.63 393,502,083.81
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Table 10: Short-term Loan Exposure Descriptive Analysis Summary 
The descriptive analysis of the last observed independent variable, Short-term Loan 
Exposure, gives insight into the different institutions willingness to fund enterprises with 
little or no history as these are the enterprises which are more likely to qualify for short-term 
loans rather than long-term loans. It is interesting to note that even though all three DFIs have 
largely differing portfolio sizes, their short-term loan exposure mean is very close to the 
pooled industry proxy.  SEFA has the lowest mean of the three institutions which was 
expected. Statistics indicated that SEFA is more inclined to fund short-term loans than the 
other two DFIs. 
In terms of consistency, Business Partners is the least volatile of the three institutions with 
regards to short-term loan exposure with the lowest standard deviation and sample variance, 
followed by SEFA with NEF being the most volatile. With SEFA having the smallest loan 
portfolio, these analysis results indicate that SEFA is the most aggressive DFI in terms of 
growing its short-term loan portfolio which may lead to an interpretation that SEFA has the 
highest willingness to provide short-term loans which have a high startup allocation than 
long-term loans. 
The descriptive analysis supports the hypothesis that the DFI have a higher risk appetite. The 
analysis also indicates that even though Business Partners is the most consistent of the three 
DFIs, SEFA has been the most aggressive DFI and this is reflective in its risk appetite which 
is higher over the period 2013 – 2015 when all DFIs were operational. 
STLE STLEBP STLENEF STLESEFA STLE (Pooled)
Mean 313,936,400.00 336,755,042.80 261,067,666.67 310,512,324.15
Standard Error 16,397,443.23 76,770,210.30 72,494,832.33 32,583,244.11
Median 323,320,000.00 383,652,347.00 252,711,000.00 323,320,000.00
Mode #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Standard Deviation 36,665,797.72 171,663,408.87 125,564,732.88 117,480,557.36
Sample Variance 1.34438E+15 2.94683E+16 1.57665E+16 1.38017E+16
Kurtosis 0.397556708 -0.699411275 #DIV/0! 0.076111021
Skewness -0.407017295 -0.739155235 0.298160454 -0.257706854
Range 98,435,000.00 424,793,521.00 250,712,000.00 424,793,521.00
Minimum 261,480,000.00 87,934,546.00 139,890,000.00 87,934,546.00
Maximum 359,915,000.00 512,728,067.00 390,602,000.00 512,728,067.00
Sum 1,569,682,000.00 1,683,775,214.00 783,203,000.00 4,036,660,214.00
Count 5 5 3 13
Largest(1) 359,915,000.00 512,728,067.00 390,602,000.00 512,728,067.00
Smallest(1) 261,480,000.00 87,934,546.00 139,890,000.00 87,934,546.00
Confidence Level(95.0%) 45,526,600.99 213,148,274.60 311,920,088.22 70,992,790.30
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5.2.2 Total loan portfolio trend analysis 
A trend analysis was conducted using graphical methods, plotting the observed variables on a 
line chart over the research period. 
The figures outlined below highlight interesting trends that can be picked up from visual 
analysis of the variables. 
Figure 16: DFI Portfolio Risk Appetite Figure 17: Total Approved Loans 
Growth Rate 
In Figure 16, the risk appetite ratio extrapolated from collected data and indicates clear risk 
appetite trends for Business Partners, National Empowerment Fund and the Small Enterprise 
Finance Agency. The risk appetite level of Business Partners over the period 2011 – 2013 
experienced a downward trend which indicates a reduction in the institution's risk appetite 
before changing into a positive trend from 2014 which indicates a positive change in the 
institution's risk appetite. It is also important to note that the downward trend and subsequent 
upward trend experience by Business Partners was gradual in slope when compared to the 
National Empowerment Fund and the Small Enterprise Finance agency (SEFA) during the 
same period. 
The National Empowerment Fund (NEF) experienced an initial increase in risk appetite 
between 2011 and 2012 followed by a decrease in risk appetite between 2012 and 2013 
before experiencing a drastic reduction in risk appetite between 2013 and 2014 which is 
explainable by the moratorium on funds experienced by the NEF at that stage before 
improving again on a positive path from 2014 onwards. 
SEFA unlike the other two DFIs has only been operational since 2013 and the risk appetite of 
SEFA was thus only captured from 2013 onwards. SEFA has experienced a gradual decrease 
in risk appetite since 2013 till 2015. It is interesting to note that even though SEFA has been 
on a constant decrease risk appetite trend since 2013, SEFA has maintained a risk appetite 
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level which is higher than both Business Partners and NEF over the period it has been 
operational. 
Figure 16 represents the Total Approved Loans Growth Rate which reflects the changes in 
the total approved loans over the study period. An important factor to note is that the most 
volatile DFIs in terms of changes in approved loans growth rate is NEF and SEFA. NEF 
experienced the most volatile changes due to the moratorium it self-imposed due to limited 
available funding resources whereas SEFA experienced a high growth rate from inception 
which later decreased drastically during the 2014/2015 financial period. All three institutions 
have maintained an overall positive growth in loan approvals with SEFA and NEF adopting 
the most aggressive position of the three DFIs. An interesting trend that is illustrated in 
Figure 16 is the downward growth trend experienced by both Business Partners and SEFA 
during the 2014/2015 financial period indicating a possible external factor influence to their 
growth rates.  
Figure 18 and 19 below indicate a positively correlated relationship between all the DFIs with 
regards to the long-term loan exposure trends and the short-term loan exposure trends 
observable in the figures. Business Partners is evident to have the largest long-term loan 
exposure out of the three DFIs, NEF, the second largest which is followed by SEFA which 
has the lowest long-term loan exposure. The three DFIs have all maintained a positive growth 
rate in their long-term loan exposure with only SEFA standing out in terms of their high slope 
coefficient indicating a faster growth in the long-term loans exposure compared to the other 
two DFIs. 
Figure 18: Long-term exposure to total  Figure 19: Short-term exposure to total 
loan approvals loan approvals 
When analysing Figure 19, the most important aspect that is highlighted is the change in 
short-term loan exposure experienced by all three DFIs. There is a positive trend experienced 
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by all of the DFIs which indicates that the short-term loan exposure has been growing over 
the period 2011 to 2015. The NEF has experienced the largest change in terms of short-term 
loan exposure.  It has maintained a steady steep growth trend which has seen the NEF change 
from having the lowest short-term loan exposure in 2011 out of all of the DFIs to surpassing 
Business Partners in 2012 which has the largest short-term loan exposure of the three 
institutions. An important aspect to note is that SEFA out of the three DFIs has the highest 
short-term loan exposure to total loans approved. 
Figure 20: Total Portfolio Growth Rate 
Figure 20 indicates the level of aggressive growth or decline that was experienced by the 
DFIs during the 2011 to 2015 period. This figure shows that Business Partners portfolio 
experienced a negative growth between 2011 and 2013 then an increasing positive rate post 
2013before slowing slightly in 2015. This trend is quite different for NEF which experienced 
aggressive portfolio size growth from 2011 to 2012, slowing down from 2012 to 2013 before 
experiencing negative growth rates from between 2013 and mid-2014 during the moratorium 
period which was finally followed by an aggressive portfolio growth from mid-2014 to 2015 
reflecting renewed intention to fund. 
SEFA experienced similar aggressive portfolio growth rates since its inception. It 
experienced the highest growth rate in 2014 and slower growth from 2014 resulting in 
SEFA’s growth rate being surpassed by NEF’s in 2015. It is interesting to note that over the 
same period, Business Partners maintained the lowest portfolio growth rate, being surpassed 
by NEF and SEFA. In terms of ranking, in 2015 NEF had the highest portfolio growth rate 
followed by SEFA and lastly Business Partners. 
66 
5.3 Econometric Analysis 
The previous section of this research paper focused on the descriptive analysis conducted on 
the different variables identified as affecting risk appetite.  It is clear from the variables above 
that they all have an effect on the risk appetite of the DFIs, but what is not clear is to what 
extent these variables and factors actually influence risk appetite and to what level this 
influence is.  
In the following regression analysis section, I will address this problem by statistically 
analysing all the independent variables against the dependent variable using a panel data 
methodology taking into consideration model assumptions and challenges in achieving the 
statistically significant model below that is used to analyse the risk appetite of the three DFIs. 
5.3.1 Model diagnostic tests 
In order for the results to be valid and reliable and before doing any time series analysis, 
certain statistical tests were conducted on the data to check for the existence of Stationarity 
using the standard unit root test, the Dickey-Fuller test; Cointegration using the Johansen test; 
Heteroscedasticity using the Wald or Breusch-Page and White test; Autocorrelation using the 
Wooldridge autocorrelation test and covariance based on the covariance and 
multicollinearity. 
One of the biggest challenges when doing research or analysis of small samples such as this 
data set, is the ability to minimise Type I and Type II errors. Type I error occurs when we 
reject a true null hypothesis whereas Type II error occurs when we do not reject a false null 
hypothesis. Due to the sample size of this data set, a nonparametric test is best in lieu of the t-
test as mentioned by Siegel (1957). Posten in his 1982 research identified the Wilcoxon test 
as the test which provided the highest statistical power in small sample sizes (Winter, J.C.F. 
2013). Results from Janusonis (2009) were contrary to Siegel which recommended that the 
application of t-test on extremely small samples is feasible and thus this research paper has 
utilised the t-statistics to determine significance. 
A Hausman test was conducted to determine which technique should be used when analysing 
the data. A Hausman test tests whether the cross-sectional between-effect is different from 
the cross-sectional within effect. This test is conducted in order to determine the appropriate 
panel data methodology between fixed effects and random effects through determining if 
there is any correlation between the explanatory variable and the constant or error term. The 
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Hausman test is based on testing “the difference between the random effects and fixed effects 
estimates” (Wooldridge, J. 2002). It evaluates the estimator consistency against a less 
efficient known estimator. The test compares the ordinary least squares estimator (OLS) 
against the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator to determine the existence of 
endogeneity (Wooldridge, J. 2002). Based on data collected and on the sample space 
identified, the research paper has used unbalanced panel data due to limitations in available 
data and thus the parameters outlined for the data to be sourced. Therefore a random effects 
model with GLS estimators was used. 
Multicollinearity is a challenge in regression modelling, a term used to indicate the existence 
of a correlation between independent variables resulting in estimates of the regression 
coefficient having large sampling errors (Keller, G. 2012). In larger samples, 
multicollinearity is not as much a problem as in small samples such as the sample for this 
research paper. The large sampling errors due to multicollinearity have two consequences: 1) 
sample coefficients may be quite different from the actual population; 2) The t-statistics of 
the coefficients will be small, leading to inference of there being no existence of a linear 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable when there is 
(Keller, G. 2012). Multicollinearity was tested for and the variables selected in the developed 
regression model were selected based on a theoretical and literature based regression 
modelling method in order to identify and address the existence of multicollinearity. This 
processes resulted in the possible existence of omitted variable bias limiting the interpretation 
of the included independent variables due to the exclusion of certain explanatory correlated 
variables.  
Stationarity test – Cluster level Time Series 
The test for stationarity is conducted to ascertain if any time series’ variability or statistical 
distribution is dependent on time as this influences the interpretation of results and the 
reliability of results presented by the regression models.  
Stationarity tests were conducted on the dependent and all the independent variables utilising 
three different testing methods to ensure accuracy of results. The Dick-Fuller test and 
Phillips-Perron test were conducted with the following null hypothesis H0: There is a unit 
root for the series. The KPPS test was also conducted with the following null hypothesis H0: 
The series is stationary. 
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Table 11: Risk Appetite (RA) – Time Series (Dependent Variable) 
For the dependent variable (RA), all the results of the Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests 
conducted for the (BP), (NEF) and (SEFA) time series returned significant p-value statistics 
indication that we reject the null hypothesis and infer that all the series are stationary at an 
alpha of 5%. The KPSS test p-value for (BP), (NEF) and (SEFA) variable returned 
statistically insignificant results at an alpha of 5% indicating that the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected and therefore we can infer that all these (RA) times series are trend stationary 
which supports the ADF and PP test results. 
Table 12: Long-term Loan Exposure (LTLE) – Times Series (Independent Variable) 
For the independent variable (LTLE), all the results of the Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron 
tests conducted for the (BP), (NEF) and (SEFA) time series returned insignificant p-value 
statistics which indicates that  the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and therefore infer that 
in all of the (LTLE) series there exists a unit root. The KPSS test p-value for the (BP), (NEF) 
and (SEFA) variable returned statistically insignificant results which indicates that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected and therefore we can infer that all these (LTLE) time series are 
trend stationary. This difference in results provides insight into the possibility of 
heteroscedasticity in the times series. 
Table 13: Short-term Loan Exposure (STLE) – Times Series (Independent Variable) 
For the independent variable (STLE), all the results of the Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
Perron (PP) tests conducted for the (BP), (NEF) and (SEFA) time series returned insignificant 
p-value statistics at an alpha of 5% indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis and
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF(stationary) / k: 1 / RA): Phillips-Perron test (PP(no intercept) / Lag: Short / RA): KPSS test (Level / Lag Short / RA):
BP NEF SEFA BP NEF SEFA BP NEF SEFA
Tau (Observed value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Tau (Observed value) -0.391 -0.809 -11.454 Eta (Observed value) 0.152 0.342 0.329
Tau (Critical value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Tau (Critical value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Eta (Critical value) 0.425 0.425 0.332
p-value (one-tailed) < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 p-value (one-tailed) < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 p-value (one-tailed) 0.553 0.136 0.084
alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05 alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05 alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF(stationary) / k: 1 / LTLE): Phillips-Perron test (PP(no intercept) / Lag: Short / LTLE): KPSS test (Level / Lag Short / LTLE):
BP NEF SEFA BP NEF SEFA BP NEF SEFA
Tau (Observed value) 0.152 0.342 0.329 Tau (Observed value) 3.619 3.645 1.041 Eta (Observed value) 0.487 0.500 0.332
Tau (Critical value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Tau (Critical value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Eta (Critical value) 0.425 0.425 0.332
p-value (one-tailed) 1.000 1.000 1.000 p-value (one-tailed) 1.000 1.000 1.000 p-value (one-tailed) 0.011 0.006 0.043
alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05 alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05 alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF(stationary) / k: 1 / STLE): Phillips-Perron test (PP(no intercept) / Lag: Short / STLE): KPSS test (Level / Lag Short / STLE):
BP NEF SEFA BP NEF SEFA BP NEF SEFA
Tau (Observed value) 0.487 0.500 0.332 Tau (Observed value) 3.347 1.301 7.276 Eta (Observed value) 0.484 0.503 0.333
Tau (Critical value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Tau (Critical value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Eta (Critical value) 0.425 0.425 0.332
p-value (one-tailed) 1.000 1.000 1.000 p-value (one-tailed) 1.000 1.000 1.000 p-value (one-tailed) 0.012 0.005 0.037
alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05 alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05 alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05
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therefore we infer that the different series have a unit root. The KPSS test p-value for (BP), 
(NEF) and (SEFA) variable returned statistically significant results at an alpha of 5% which 
indicates that we reject the null hypothesis and therefore we can infer that all of these (STLE) 
times series are not trend stationary. Taking into consideration the difference between the 
ADF, PP and KPSS test, the results imply the series STLE has a unit root. 
Table 14: Total Approved Loans Amount (TALA) – Times Series (Independent 
Variable) 
For the independent variable (TALA), all the results of the Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron 
tests conducted for the (BP), (NEF) and (SEFA) time series returned insignificant p-value 
statistics at an alpha of 5% which indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis and 
therefore we infer that the different series have a unit root. The KPSS test p-value for the 
(BP), (NEF) and (SEFA) variable returned statistically insignificant results at an alpha of 5% 
which indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis and therefore we can infer that all of 
these (TALA) time series are stationary. Due to the fact that we cannot reject the SDF. PP 
and KPSS null hypothesis indicates that the level of observations for this time series may be 
insufficient. This is an acknowledged challenge of limited observation due to the limited 
information made available by the different development finance institutions.   
Table 15: Total Non-performing Loans-lagged (TNPLLG) – Times Series (Independent 
Variable) 
For the independent lagged variable (TNPLLG), all of the results of the Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron tests conducted for the (BP), (NEF) and (SEFA) time series returned 
insignificant p-value statistics at an alpha of 5% which indicates that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis and therefore we infer that the different series have a unit root. The KPSS test p-
value for the (BP) and (SEFA) variable returned statistically significant results at an alpha of 
5% which indicate that we reject the null hypothesis and therefore we can infer that the 
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF(stationary) / k: 1 / TALA): Phillips-Perron test (PP(no intercept) / Lag: Short / TALA): KPSS test (Level / Lag Short / TALA):
BP NEF SEFA BP NEF SEFA BP NEF SEFA
Tau (Observed value) 0.484 0.503 0.333 Tau (Observed value) 0.601 -0.250 1.852 Eta (Observed value) 0.316 0.115 0.330
Tau (Critical value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Tau (Critical value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Eta (Critical value) 0.425 0.425 0.332
p-value (one-tailed) 1.000 1.000 1.000 p-value (one-tailed) 1.000 1.000 1.000 p-value (one-tailed) 0.172 0.741 0.078
alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05 alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05 alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF(stationary) / k: 1 / TNPLLG): Phillips-Perron test (PP(no intercept) / Lag: Short / TNPLLG):KPSS test (Level / Lag Short / TNPLLG):
BP NEF SEFA BP NEF SEFA BP NEF SEFA
Tau (Observed value) 0.316 0.115 0.330 Tau (Observed value) -3.698 -0.346 65535.000 Eta (Observed value) 0.402 0.089 0.250
Tau (Critical value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Tau (Critical value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Eta (Critical value) 0.395 0.395 0.000
p-value (one-tailed) 1.000 1.000 1.000 p-value (one-tailed) 1.000 1.000 1.000 p-value (one-tailed) 0.039 0.938 < 0.0001
alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05 alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05 alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05
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(TNPLLG) times series for (BP) and (SEFA) are not trend stationary. KPSS result for (NEF) 
(TNPLLG) time series was not statistically insignificant at an alpha of 5% and therefore we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis for the (NEF) (TNPLLG) time series and thus infer that the 
(NEF) (TNPLLG) time series is trend stationary. These results provide contradicting results 
with the TNPLLG times series for BP and SEFA indicating the existence of a unit root in the 
times series but for the NEF (TNPLLG) times series the results for ADF and KPSS indicate 
that the observations in the data set may not be sufficient.  
Table 16: South African Gross Domestic Product Growth rate-lagged (GDPGSALG) – 
Time Series (Independent Variable) 
For the independent lagged variable (GDPGSALG), all the results of the Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron tests conducted for the (BP), (NEF) and (SEFA) time series returned 
insignificant p-value statistics at an alpha of 5% indicating that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis and therefore we infer that the different series have a unit root. The KPSS test p-
value for (BP), (NEF) and (SEFA) variable also returned statistically insignificant results at 
an alpha of 5% indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis and therefore we can infer 
that all these (GDPGSALG) times series are stationary. Based on the contradicting results 
from the ADF and KPSS, the implication is that there may be insufficient observations from 
this time series. 
Based on the results obtained from the ADF, PP and KPSS unit root and stationarity tests, it 
was evident that a cointegration existed in these individual regression models and thus a 
cointegration test was required in order to ascertain how to address the cointegration problem 
resulting from the ADF, PP and KPSS test results.  Prior to conducting the cointegration test 
for these variables, which were analysed and tested as three different cluster data time series,  
additional ADF, PP and KPSS tests were run on the pooled data to ascertain if the unit root 
and non-stationarity challenge existed in this pooled data set. 
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF(stationary) / k: 1 / GDPGSALG): Phillips-Perron test (PP(no intercept) / Lag: Short / GDPGSALG):KPSS test (Level / Lag Short / GDPGSALG):
BP NEF SEFA BP NEF SEFA BP NEF SEFA
Tau (Observed value) 0.402 0.089 0.250 Tau (Observed value) -3.841 -3.841 -1.370 Eta (Observed value) 0.371 0.371 0.280
Tau (Critical value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Tau (Critical value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Eta (Critical value) 0.395 0.395 0.332
p-value (one-tailed) 1.000 1.000 1.000 p-value (one-tailed) 1.000 1.000 1.000 p-value (one-tailed) 0.089 0.089 0.327
alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05 alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05 alpha 0.05 0.05 0.05
71 
Stationarity test – Pooled level Time Series 
Table 17: Risk Appetite (RA) – Time Series (Dependent Variable) 
For the dependent variable (RA) time series, all the results of the ADF, PP and KPSS tests 
conducted for the time series returned insignificant p-value statistics which indicates that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis for all three tests. This implies that unit root existence is 
present and or trend-stationarity which is contradictive thus implying that cointegration may 
exist or that there are insufficient observations for this time series in the data set.  
Table 18: Long-term Loan Exposure (LTLE) – Times Series (Independent Variable) 
For the independent variable (LTLE) time series, all the results of the ADF, PP and KPSS 
tests conducted for the time series returned insignificant p-value statistics indicating that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis for all three tests. This implies that unit root existence is 
present and or trend-stationarity which is contradictive thus implying that cointegration may 
exist or that there are insufficient observations for this time series in the data set. 
Table 19: Short-term Loan Exposure (STLE) – Times Series (Independent Variable) 
For the independent variable (STLE), all the results of the Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
Perron (PP) tests conducted for the time series returned insignificant p-value statistics at an 
alpha of 5% indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis and therefore we infer that 
the different pooled time series have a unit root existence. The KPSS test p-value for the 
pooled (STLE) time series returned statistically significant results at an alpha of 5% 
indicating that we reject the null hypothesis and therefore we can infer that all these (STLE) 
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF(stationary) / k: 2 / RA): Phillips-Perron test (PP(no intercept) / Lag: Short / RA): KPSS test (Level / Lag Short / RA):
Tau (Observed value) -2.518 Tau (Observed value) -0.598 Eta (Observed value) 0.154
Tau (Critical value) 0.021 Tau (Critical value) 0.021 Eta (Critical value) 0.461
p-value (one-tailed) 0.263 p-value (one-tailed) 0.263 p-value (one-tailed) 0.438
alpha 0.05 alpha 0.05 alpha 0.05
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF(stationary) / k: 2 / LTLE): Phillips-Perron test (PP(no intercept) / Lag: Short / LTLE): KPSS test (Level / Lag Short / LTLE):
Tau (Observed value) -1.829 Tau (Observed value) -1.702 Eta (Observed value) 0.081
Tau (Critical value) 0.021 Tau (Critical value) 0.021 Eta (Critical value) 0.461
p-value (one-tailed) 0.511 p-value (one-tailed) 0.511 p-value (one-tailed) 0.777
alpha 0.05 alpha 0.05 alpha 0.05
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF(stationary) / k: 2 / STLE): Phillips-Perron test (PP(no intercept) / Lag: Short / STLE): KPSS test (Level / Lag Short / STLE):
Tau (Observed value) -2.001 Tau (Observed value) -0.073 Eta (Observed value) 0.511
Tau (Critical value) 0.021 Tau (Critical value) 0.021 Eta (Critical value) 0.461
p-value (one-tailed) 0.442 p-value (one-tailed) 0.442 p-value (one-tailed) 0.034
alpha 0.05 alpha 0.05 alpha 0.05
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time series are not trend stationary. Taking into consideration the difference between the 
ADF, PP and KPSS test, the results imply the pooled series STLE has a unit root. 
Table 20: Total Approved Loans Amount (TALA) – Times Series (Independent 
Variable) 
For the independent variable (TALA) time series, all the results of the ADF, PP and KPSS 
tests conducted for the pooled time series returned insignificant p-value statistics indicating 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis for all three tests. This implies that unit root 
existence is present and or trend-stationarity which is contradictive thus implying that 
cointegration may exist or that there are insufficient observations for this time series in the 
data set. 
Table 21: Total Non-performing Loans-lagged (TNPLLG) – Times Series (Independent 
Variable) 
For the independent variable (TNPLLG) Time series, all the results of the ADF, PP and 
KPSS tests conducted for the pooled time series returned insignificant p-value statistics 
indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis for all three tests. This implies that unit 
root existence is present and or trend-stationarity which is contradictive thus implying that 
cointegration may exist or that there are insufficient observations for this time series in the 
data set. 
Table 22: South African Gross Domestic Product Growth rate-lagged (GDPGSALG) – 
Time Series (Independent Variable) 
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF(stationary) / k: 2 / TALA): Phillips-Perron test (PP(no intercept) / Lag: Short / TALA): KPSS test (Level / Lag Short / TALA):
Tau (Observed value) -1.583 Tau (Observed value) -1.194 Eta (Observed value) 0.159
Tau (Critical value) 0.021 Tau (Critical value) 0.021 Eta (Critical value) 0.461
p-value (one-tailed) 0.608 p-value (one-tailed) 0.608 p-value (one-tailed) 0.418
alpha 0.05 alpha 0.05 alpha 0.05
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF(stationary) / k: 2 / TNPLLG): Phillips-Perron test (PP(no intercept) / Lag: Short / TNPLLG): KPSS test (Level / Lag Short / TNPLLG):
Tau (Observed value) -1.350 Tau (Observed value) -0.515 Eta (Observed value) 0.266
Tau (Critical value) 0.475 Tau (Critical value) 0.475 Eta (Critical value) 0.457
p-value (one-tailed) 0.594 p-value (one-tailed) 0.594 p-value (one-tailed) 0.202
alpha 0.05 alpha 0.05 alpha 0.05
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF(stationary) / k: 2 / GDPGSALG): Phillips-Perron test (PP(no intercept) / Lag: Short / GDPGSALG): KPSS test (Level / Lag Short / GDPGSALG):
Tau (Observed value) -2.422 Tau (Observed value) -2.836 Eta (Observed value) 0.907
Tau (Critical value) 0.243 Tau (Critical value) 0.243 Eta (Critical value) 0.459
p-value (one-tailed) 0.283 p-value (one-tailed) 0.283 p-value (one-tailed) 0.000
alpha 0.05 alpha 0.05 alpha 0.05
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For the independent variable (GDPGSALG), all the results of the Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
Phillips-Perron (PP) tests conducted for the time series returned insignificant p-value 
statistics at an alpha of 5% indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis and therefore 
we infer that the different pooled time series have a unit root existence. The KPSS test p-
value for the pooled (GDPGSALG) time series returned statistically significant results at an 
alpha of 5% indicating that we reject the null hypothesis and therefore we can infer that the 
(GDPGSALG) time series is not trend stationary. Taking into consideration the difference 
between the ADF, PP and KPSS test, the results imply the pooled series (GDPGSALG) has a 
unit root. 
Johansen cointegration test 
A cointegration Johansen test was conducted on all the time series on a cluster basis and a 
pooled basis in order to determine the level of differencing required in order to address the 
cointegration problem. Unfortunately, due to the limitation in variable observations for the 
different time series, it restricted a significant cointegration test. Based on theory and 
literature, the times series TNPLLG and GDPGSALG were both observed variables which 
were then transformed into 1 period lagged variables and this transformation impacted the 
coefficient of determination for the pooled regression model. Unfortunately, these 
transformed lagged variables did not influence the explanatory capability of the development 
finance cluster time series’ and thus was not included in the cluster regression models. 
Heteroscedasticity test 
Heteroscedasticity is tested for in this research paper based on the regression model 
assumptions where which the error term ei is assumed to be normally distributed; a mean of 
zero and have constant variance. If these assumptions are not met and the variance is not 
constant, the error term is said to be heteroscedastic.  The existence of heteroscedasticity 
informs the researcher that the regression coefficients are not best linear unbiased estimates 
or minimum variance estimates (Watsham and Parramore, 1997). The solution to the 
existence of heteroscedasticity is the transformation of the regression model so that the 
regression model is reflective of the error term relationship with the regression model or the 
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use of a superior technique, Generalized Least Squares, used in this study yielding BLUE 
estimators in the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
Autocorrelation test 
The test for autocorrelation was conducted on the dataset to test whether the error terms 
(residuals) exhibit a level of autocorrelation.  This level of autocorrelation occurs when the 
error terms are found not to be independent. If autocorrelation exists, the regression 
coefficients are unbiased but with underestimated standard errors making the regression 
coefficient tests unreliable (Watsham, J and Parramore, K. 1997). It is important to note that 
autocorrelation which is based on the autoregressive scheme is caused by omitted variables or 
wrong functional form of the regression estimating equation. In this research paper, the 
Durbin-Watson test statistic was used to determine the existence of autocorrelation which is 
discussed in the following regression models and results. 
Multicollinearity 
Test for multicollinearity is important for the regression model as the test indicates if the 
independent variables are uncorrelated.  Multicollinearity occurs when a number or all of the 
independent variables in the regression model are highly correlated, which results in the 
regression model having difficulty separating the explanatory effects of the difference 
independent variables. This causes instability with the regression coefficients resulting in 
unreliable coefficients. This may result in high R², high standard errors but small t-statistics 
indicating last of significance (Watsham, J and Parramore, K. 1997). In this research paper, 
multicollinearity was detected using the variance inflation factor and addressed and reduced 
through omitting certain highly correlated variables and the pooling of the cross-section and 
time-series data. Due to the nature of the regression model and the independent variables 
included due to theory, the existence of multicollinearity was expected. 
The first step when conducting panel data analysis is to determine which technique to utilise 
between the fixed or random effects model or to utilise a pooled regression technique. 
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df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 0.006753439 0.002251146 440.9689 0.034988613
Residual 1 5.105E-06 5.105E-06
Total 4 0.006758544
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.501420928 0.014188929 35.33888496 0.01801 0.321133492 0.681708364 0.321133492 0.681708364
LTLE -2.29842E-10 2.19136E-11 -10.48856686 0.060514 -5.08281E-10 4.85965E-11 -5.08281E-10 4.85965E-11
STLE -3.24828E-10 7.34202E-11 -4.42423969 0.141516 -1.25772E-09 6.08063E-10 -1.25772E-09 6.08063E-10
TALA 4.87546E-10 1.57523E-11 30.95070545 0.020562 2.87393E-10 6.87698E-10 2.87393E-10 6.87698E-10
5.3.2 Regression models 
This section will present the regression results for the two different regression models 
equation (6) and (7) and the interpretation of their regression results. 
5.3.2.1 Business Partners Regression Model 
The correlation matrix indicates that the RA variable is negatively correlated with the LTLE 
and STLE whereas the TALA variable indicates a very strong positive relationship.  The 
LTLE and STLE variables are positively correlated as can be expected from literature and 
theory. The interesting dynamic is the small negative relationship between the TALA 
variable and the LTLE and STLE variables which indicates an increase in the TALA variable 
results in an inverse effect on the LTLE and STLE variable.  
The regression model fitted very well when used to analyse the independent variables 
influencing Risk Appetite of the institution. Intercept, LTLE and TALA coefficients were 
found to be statistically significant with p-values of 0.018, 0.0605 and 0.0205 respectively. 
The regression model with a statistically significant F-statistics indicates that the problem of 
omission variables is limited in this regression model.  
Correlation matrix:
LTLE STLE TALA RA
LTLE 1 0.888 0.729 -0.124
STLE 0.888 1 0.520 -0.345
TALA 0.729 0.520 1 0.584
RA -0.124 -0.345 0.584 1
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The regression coefficients supported the assumptions that Risk Appetite is influenced by the 
independent variables. The LTLE variable negatively influences the Risk Appetite of 
Business Partners with every one unit increase in LTLE all other variables fixed, will result in 
a small negative change in the Risk Appetite variable. This was also the case for the STLE 
variable with the negative coefficient indicating that a positive change in the STLE variable 
will result in a small negative change in the Risk Appetite of Business Partners. The TALA 
variable has a positive coefficient indicating that the TALA variable has a direct and positive 
influence on the Risk Appetite variable. A positive change in the TALA variable will result in 
a small positive change in the Risk Appetite variable. 
The above standardize coefficients confirm the negative relationship between RA and the 
LTLE and STLE variables with the LTLE variable being the variable with the stronger 
negative relationship with RA. The TALA variable indicates a very strong positive 
relationship with the RA variable with the TALA variable being the only significant variable 
at an alpha of 5%. 
5.3.2.2 National Empowerment Fund Regression Model 
The correlation matrix indicates that the RA variable is negatively correlated with the LTLE 
and STLE whereas the TALA variable indicates a very strong positive relationship.  The 
LTLE and STLE variables are positively correlated as can be expected from literature and 
theory. The interesting dynamic is the small negative relationship between the TALA 
variable and the LTLE and STLE variables which indicates an increase in the TALA variable 
results in an inverse effect on the LTLE and STLE variable.  
Standardized coefficients (RA):
Source Value Standard error t Pr > |t| Lower bound (95%) Upper bound (95%)
LTLE -0.857 0.082 -10.489 0.061 -1.894 0.181
STLE -0.290 0.065 -4.424 0.142 -1.122 0.542
TALA 1.358 0.044 30.951 0.021 0.801 1.916
Correlation matrix:
LTLE STLE TALA RA
LTLE 1 0.985 -0.038 -0.610
STLE 0.985 1 -0.101 -0.658
TALA -0.038 -0.101 1 0.811
RA -0.610 -0.658 0.811 1
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The regression model was then applied to NEF data set with the regression result indicating 
that the regression model’s F-statistic is statistically significant with an adjusted R² of 
98.496% indicating that the selected independent variables explain very well any possible 
changes in the Risk Appetite variable for the NEF. The LTLE and STLE variable coefficients 
indicated a negative relationship with the institutions Risk Appetite but the coefficients were 
found not to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.56 and 0.61 respectively. The only 
statistically significant variable is the TALA variable which indicated a positive relationship 
with the Risk Appetite variable with its coefficient being statistically significant at a p-value 
of 0.0543. 
The above standardize coefficients confirm the negative relationship between RA and the 
LTLE and STLE variables with the LTLE variable being the variable with the stronger 
negative relationship with RA. The TALA variable indicates a positive relationship with the 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 0.422596651 0.14086555 88.33318023 0.078018451
Residual 1 0.001594707 0.001594707
Total 4 0.424191358
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.923260596 0.522940817 1.765516415 0.328083315 -5.721332488 7.56785368 -5.721332488 7.56785368
LTLE -6.76111E-10 8.19506E-10 -0.825022909 0.560850975 -1.10889E-08 9.7367E-09 -1.10889E-08 9.7367E-09
STLE -5.13572E-10 7.25674E-10 -0.707717119 0.607914487 -9.73414E-09 8.70699E-09 -9.73414E-09 8.70699E-09
TALA 7.04305E-10 6.0188E-11 11.70174589 0.054271969 -6.04564E-11 1.46907E-09 -6.04564E-11 1.46907E-09
Standardized coefficients (RA):
Source Value Standard error t Pr > |t| Lower bound (95%) Upper bound (95%)
LTLE -0.314 0.381 -0.825 0.561 -5.154 4.525
STLE -0.271 0.383 -0.708 0.608 -5.131 4.590
TALA 0.772 0.066 11.702 0.054 -0.066 1.611
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Coefficients of determination (R²):
Variables RA LTLE STLE TALA
RA 1 0.996 0.964 1.000
LTLE 0.996 1 0.984 0.997
STLE 0.964 0.984 1 0.967
TALA 1.000 0.997 0.967 1
5.3.2.3 Small Enterprise Finance Agency Regression Model 
The correlation matrix indicates that the RA variable is negatively correlated with the LTLE, 
STLE and TALA variable indicating a very strong inverse relationship.  The LTLE and 
STLE variables are positively correlated and the TALA and STLE variable are positively 
correlated which is expected from literature and theory. There is sample bias due to the small 
number of observations. 
The p-values and the coefficients of determination results for the inclusion of the three 
variables in the regression model for SEFA is confirmed by their statistically significant p-
value and high R² at an alpha of 5% for LTLE and TALA with STLE being significant at an 
alpha of 10%.  
The sample size for SEFA was over a three year period with variables observed on an annual 
basis, thus only providing three observable variables per independent variable for this 
regression model. The most important result to recognise in the linear regression model for 
SEFA is the R² = 1. This implies that this model is a perfect fit which in statistical terms is a 
Correlation matrix (Pearson):
Variables RA LTLE STLE TALA
RA 1 -0.998 -0.982 -1.000
LTLE -0.998 1 0.992 0.998
STLE -0.982 0.992 1 0.984
TALA -1.000 0.998 0.984 1
Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level alpha=0.05
p-values:
Variables RA LTLE STLE TALA
RA 0 0.041 0.121 0.006
LTLE 0.041 0 0.080 0.035
STLE 0.121 0.080 0 0.116
TALA 0.006 0.035 0.116 0









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 0.712017741 0.237339247 6.28743E+30 2.93166E-16
Residual 1 3.77482E-32 3.77482E-32
Total 4 0.712017741
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -1.11022E-16 1.37383E-16 -0.808122036 0.567306208 -1.85664E-15 1.6346E-15 -1.85664E-15 1.6346E-15
LTLE -6.24827E-09 2.24503E-24 -2.78315E+15 2.2874E-16 -6.24827E-09 -6.24827E-09 -6.24827E-09 -6.24827E-09
STLE 3.16667E-09 5.57155E-24 5.68365E+14 1.12009E-15 3.16667E-09 3.16667E-09 3.16667E-09 3.16667E-09
TALA 4.08608E-09 5.10962E-24 7.99684E+14 7.9609E-16 4.08608E-09 4.08608E-09 4.08608E-09 4.08608E-09
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very rear occurrence and in this case it is not. This regression result was attributed to the 
limited observed variables in the sample but the independent variables are still statistically 
significant indicating that the Risk Appetite of SEFA is indeed also influenced by the above-
observed variables. 
5.3.2.4 Pooled Development Finance Institutions Regression Model 1 
A pooled regression model was then developed based on equation (6) with the intention of 
further potential of analysis relating to the Risk Appetite dependent variable. Regression 
model equation (6) constitutions the same three independent variables and the pooled results 
presented three statistically significant coefficients being the intercept with a p-value of 
0.035, the LTLE variable coefficient with a p-value of 0.007 and the TALA variable 
coefficient p-value of 0.002. Only the STLE variable coefficient presented results which were 
not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.771. The pooled regression model as a whole 
had an F-statistic that was statistically significant with an adjusted R² of 52.81% indicating 
that even though the pooled regression model is not a great fit, the independent variable 
included in the model explain 52.81% of the variation in the Risk Appetite variable.  
This lower coefficient of determination result indicated that this pooled regression model may 
have variable omission bias and thus additional variables were included into the regression 
model in order to match the regression equation (7) outlined in the theory. Below is the 
results for equation (7) regression model using pooled data. 








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 0.890099489 0.29669983 6.221583294 0.009974162
Residual 11 0.524576779 0.047688798
Total 14 1.414676269
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.29807387 0.124233836 2.399296999 0.03527642 0.02463704 0.5715107 0.024637 0.571511
LTLE -4.62888E-10 1.40219E-10 -3.301173756 0.007063264 -7.71509E-10 -1.54268E-10 -7.7E-10 -1.5E-10
STLE 1.42749E-10 4.78288E-10 0.298457977 0.770916001 -9.09957E-10 1.19545E-09 -9.1E-10 1.2E-09
TALA 9.41932E-10 2.30311E-10 4.08982593 0.001790058 4.35021E-10 1.44884E-09 4.35E-10 1.45E-09
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Multicolinearity statistics:
LTLE STLE TALA TNPLLG GDPGSALG DFIID-BP DFIID-NEF DFIID-SEFA DFIT-POC DFIT-SOE
Tolerance 0.006 0.129 0.123 0.126 0.145 0.000 0.019 0.029 0.000 0.000
VIF 174.943 7.745 8.102 7.916 6.875 51.513 34.342
5.3.2.5 Pooled Development Finance Institutions Regression Model 2 
The correlation matrix above indicates that the problem of correlation is less drastic as the 
individual regression models with the initial independent variables indicating lower 
correlation values. The between variable relationships have also stated the same with LTLE 
and STLE having a negative relationship with the RA variable and the TALA variable having 
a positive relationship with the RA variable. The lagged TNPLLG variable introduced has a 
negative relationship with the RA variable whereas the lagged GDPGSALG has a positive 
relationship with the RA variable.   
The DFIID fixed variable used to identify the different DFIs was also incorporated and a 
negative relationship with RA was detected for Business Partners and a positive relationship 
with RA for NEF and SEFA. 
A DFIT fixed variable was also introduced into the regression model to detect if the 
ownership of the development finance institution can influence RA and the results indicated 
that state-owned development finance institutions have a positive influence of RA whereas 
privately owned development finance institutions have a negative relationship with RA.  
Based on literature and theory, multicollinearity is expected from the selected regression 
model variables and the VIF confirms it with all variables indicating a VIF higher than 5. 
Correlation matrix:
LTLE STLE TALA TNPLLG GDPGSALG DFIID-BP DFIID-NEF DFIID-SEFA DFIT-POC DFIT-SOE RA
LTLE 1 0.020 0.576 -0.576 0.068 0.894 -0.289 -0.741 0.894 -0.894 -0.472
STLE 0.020 1 -0.119 -0.291 -0.645 -0.280 0.448 -0.205 -0.280 0.280 -0.417
TALA 0.576 -0.119 1 -0.767 0.206 0.367 0.191 -0.684 0.367 -0.367 0.409
TNPLLG -0.576 -0.291 -0.767 1 0.342 -0.345 -0.086 0.528 -0.345 0.345 -0.058
GDPGSALG 0.068 -0.645 0.206 0.342 1 0.118 0.118 -0.290 0.118 -0.118 0.310
DFIID-BP 0.894 -0.280 0.367 -0.345 0.118 1 -0.667 -0.408 1.000 -1.000 -0.489
DFIID-NEF -0.289 0.448 0.191 -0.086 0.118 -0.667 1 -0.408 -0.667 0.667 0.374
DFIID-SEFA -0.741 -0.205 -0.684 0.528 -0.290 -0.408 -0.408 1 -0.408 0.408 0.141
DFIT-POC 0.894 -0.280 0.367 -0.345 0.118 1.000 -0.667 -0.408 1 -1.000 -0.489
DFIT-SOE -0.894 0.280 -0.367 0.345 -0.118 -1.000 0.667 0.408 -1.000 1 0.489
RA -0.472 -0.417 0.409 -0.058 0.310 -0.489 0.374 0.141 -0.489 0.489 1
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Type I and II sum of squares analysis results indicate that the initial regression variables are 
significant with the additional regression variables being insignificant. Type III sums of 
squares of variances the only analysis which provides insignificant results for the LTLE 
variable and the additional variables indicating that the STLE and TALA variable have the 
most positive impact on RA. 
Type I Sum of Squares analysis (RA):
Source DF Sum of squares Mean squares F Pr > F
LTLE 1 0.120 0.120 390.661 0.003
STLE 1 0.089 0.089 290.712 0.003
TALA 1 0.326 0.326 1061.600 0.001
TNPLLG 1 0.000 0.000 0.963 0.430
GDPGSALG 1 0.000 0.000 0.948 0.433
DFIID 2 0.001 0.001 1.862 0.349
DFIT 0 0.000
Type II Sum of Squares analysis (RA):
Source DF Sum of squares Mean squares F Pr > F
LTLE 1 0.002 0.002 7.019 0.118
STLE 1 0.010 0.010 33.051 0.029
TALA 1 0.063 0.063 205.522 0.005
TNPLLG 1 0.001 0.001 1.891 0.303
GDPGSALG 1 0.001 0.001 2.707 0.242
DFIID 2 0.001 0.001 1.862 0.349
DFIT 0 0.000
Type III Sum of Squares analysis (RA):
Source DF Sum of squares Mean squares F Pr > F
LTLE 1 0.002 0.002 7.019 0.118
STLE 1 0.010 0.010 33.051 0.029
TALA 1 0.063 0.063 205.522 0.005
TNPLLG 1 0.001 0.001 1.891 0.303
GDPGSALG 1 0.001 0.001 2.707 0.242




Source Value Standard error t Pr > |t| Lower bound (95%)Upper bound (95%)
Intercept 0.771 0.149 5.178 0.035 0.130 1.411
LTLE 0.000 0.000 -2.649 0.118 0.000 0.000
STLE 0.000 0.000 -5.749 0.029 0.000 0.000
TALA 0.000 0.000 14.336 0.005 0.000 0.000
TNPLLG 0.524 0.381 1.375 0.303 -1.116 2.164
GDPGSALG -4.149 2.522 -1.645 0.242 -14.999 6.701
DFIID-BP -0.060 0.186 -0.323 0.777 -0.862 0.742




The pooled regression model result presented a very high Adjusted R² indicating and 
confirming that this regression model is a good fit in explaining the dependent variable RA. 
Amongst all of the coefficients, the intercept STLE and TALA coefficients are the only ones 
which are statistically significant and both have a positive but small influence on the pooled 
RA. A Dubin-Watson of 2.863 is not statistically significant therefore the null hypothesis that 
the residuals are not autocorrelated cannot be rejected. This is supported by literature and 
theory that a level of correlation exists between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable. 
Standardised coefficients  were calculatedto provide clearer results. Only the two STLE and 
TALA coefficients are statistically significant. The negative relationship between RA and 
LTLE, STLE, GDPGSALG and DFIID-BP coefficients is clear with LTLE having the 
highest potential negative influence. The TALA, TNPLLG and DFIID-NEF have positive 
relationships with RA.  
The residual graphs below support the assumption that the autocorrelation is present in the 
data.  
Goodness of fit statistics (RA):
Observations 10.000













Source Value Standard error t Pr > |t| Lower bound (95%)Upper bound (95%)
LTLE -0.838 0.316 -2.649 0.118 -2.198 0.523
STLE -0.382 0.067 -5.749 0.029 -0.669 -0.096
TALA 0.975 0.068 14.336 0.005 0.683 1.268
TNPLLG 0.092 0.067 1.375 0.303 -0.197 0.382
GDPGSALG -0.103 0.063 -1.645 0.242 -0.373 0.167
DFIID-BP -0.127 0.394 -0.323 0.777 -1.822 1.568






The LS Means for the different development finance institutions indicate that BP has the 
lowest risk appetite followed by SEFA, whereas NEF is the development finance institution 
with the highest risk appetite. The results for the LS mean are statistically significant for 
Business Partners and NEF whereas they are not for SEFA and this could be due to the 
limited observation from SEFA.  
The second pooled regression model based on regression equation (7) resulted in a 
statistically significant F-statistics and the regression model fit improved dramatically to an 
adjusted R² of 99.5% indicating that the additional variables included in the regression model 
made a large impact. This is also supported by the slight change in the coefficients of the 
other independent variables and the standard errors indicating that now a portion of the 
previous independent variables errors terms are now better explained by the additional 
variables. 
5.4 Conclusion  
Based on the regression results and descriptive statistics, the model that provided the best fit 
and also the best minimum variance coefficients is the pooled regression model two. 
The regression models provided statistically significant results indicating that the regression 
models were developed appropriately and that the selected independent variables influence 
the dependent variable appropriately. 
From the regression results, the total approved loans amount and the short-term loans 
exposure variables have the most influence on a DFIs risk appetite and that past economic 
and institutions performance has an effect on the risk appetite of the institution. 
From the three DFIs, Business Partners was regarded as the institution with the lowest risk 
appetite even though it has such a large portfolio. SEFA had the second highest risk appetite 
with the NEF having the highest risk appetite of the three DFIs which is reflected by between 
LS Means for factor DFIID:
Category LS mean Standard error Lower bound (95%) Upper bound (95%)
BP -0.056 0.087 -0.432 0.320
NEF 0.029 0.061 -0.234 0.292
SEFA 0.004 0.115 -0.492 0.501
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cluster effects. It was interesting to note that state ownership positively influenced the risk 
appetite level of the DFI.  
Based on the regression results: 
Hypothesis 1 
H0: South African State Owned DFIs have a higher risk appetite 
H1: South African State Owned DFIs do not have a higher risk appetite 
We cannot reject the null hypothesis and thus infer that South African DFIs have a higher risk 
appetite. A larger sample size may have produced different results. 
Hypothesis 2 
H0: South African DFIs have a lower risk appetite for funding startup related funding 
products than other products. 
H1: South African DFIs have a higher risk appetite for funding startup related funding 
products. 
We reject the null hypothesis and thus infer that South African DFIs do have a risk appetite 
for funding startup related funding products. This is based on the variable STLE being 
statistically significant and having a lower negative relationship with risk appetite than the 
LTLE variable. With many startups lacking security and collateral, they are more likely to 





At the beginning of this research paper, is was my intention to analyse three South African 
DFIs with the aim and objective of addressing the hypothesis developed relating to Risk 
Appetite and  startup funding. Based on research of the application process and interactions 
with the different DFIs, the data required for the successful completion of this research paper 
was anticipated not to be a problem. Unfortunately, detailed primary and secondary research 
exposed the discrepancy between marketing and advertising messages being promoted by 
these institutions and the level of information they made available for public scrutiny. Due to 
all the information that exists but is not made available, this research paper was restricted in 
terms of the type of analysis and interpretation it could conduct regarding the DFIs risk 
appetite. 
6.2 Conclusion and Summary of research findings 
The data available enabled a regression analysis of the three DFIs. The strength of this study 
will improve based on an increased sample size. The results of this analysis indicated that an 
increase in the total approved loan amount by any of the DFIs will positively influence their 
risk appetite. An increase in short-term loan exposure would result in a slight decrease in the 
DFIs’ risk appetite of which that decrease is less than the potential decrease if the long-term 
loans exposure was increased. What this implies is that the DFIs would most likely prefer to 
increase their short-term loans exposure rather than their long-term loans exposure which 
implies that even though the increase in any type of exposure negatively influences the 
institutions risk appetite, the preference for short-term loan exposure supports the notion that 
DFIs have a higher risk appetite for funding SME and specifically startup related finance 
products. This also implies based on this study that DFIs would prefer a higher risk exposure 
to startups or startup related products provided their mandate is addressed. With NEF and 
SEFA reflecting a higher risk appetite exposure than Business Partners, it is evident that 
government DFIs have a higher risk appetite than Privately owned DFIs. 
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6.3 Recommendations 
My first and main recommendation is for these institutions with the help and insistence from 
the government, to make available additional performance metrics data on a quarterly or 
monthly basis especially information relating to these institutions mandate.  This will ensure 
that objective assessment and analysis of these DFIs operations can be conducted. Currently, 
due to limited and not disclosed data, objective analysis of these institutions’ performance, 
especially relating to the funding of startups is rather challenging as no startup metrics are 
disclosed at all by all of the three DFIs. This implies that there is no concerted effort based on 
metrics by these DFIs to ensure that the level of startup enterprises funded increases in order 
to positively impact South Africa economic growth which may not be the case. 
Another recommendation would be the development and monitoring of a standardised DFI 
performance metric table which is inclusive of startup performance metrics outlined in this 
paper to assist policy makers in achieving development goals. 
6.4 Constraints 
Potential constraints for this research paper may exist if there is no standardisation and clear 
definitions of the core indicators in terms of data to be collected from the different 
institutions which may not apply across all DFIs. 
Constraints with regards to the research to be conducted is the limited body of knowledge 
regarding Risk Appetite in DFIs that specifically looks at the development financing of 
startup enterprises. Combined with non-standardised performance metrics and varying Risk 
Management Frameworks among institutions, developing the body of knowledge in this 
sphere is important and will also identify areas of future research to be conducted. 
6.5 Limitations of the Study 
The largest limitation of this research study was the limited information disclosure from the 
three DFIs resulting in this research study focusing on secondary information based on 
observations and data from publicly available information. As a result of this limitation, this 
research paper’s ability to effectively influence policy and credit methodology applied by 
these DFIs is limited. This limitation affected the analysis of startup funding in particular due 
to limited or no data available relating to  startup funding performance metrics from the DFIs. 
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As a result of this data limitation, certain statistical tests were not conducted sufficiently or 
could not be conducted such as certain cointegration tests also impacting other statistical tests 
such as the unit root and stationarity test. 
The methodology employed, specifically panel data analysis, has a number of limitations 
specifically relating to challenges with design, data collection and the management of the 
data collected (Baltagi, B. 1998). The challenges which existed in this research paper were 
the non-response and missing observations from DFIs. These distortions impacted on the 
regression models ability to improve. 
6.6 Future areas for Research Study 
This research paper provided insight into the DFIs risk appetite and their determinants and 
how the DFIs risk appetite is influenced by these. Accessing required information will 
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